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Abstract 	  
This thesis explores current trends in social and political organising in Northern Syria, 
an area controlled by the PYD.1 The research is built on discussions between eight 
participants from the Syrian Kurdish-speaking community living in the areas. While 
most discourses on Syria and the Kurdish-speaking community have a macro-political 
focus and produce racialising descriptions of “Kurdishness” in Syria, less attention is 
granted to bottom-up organising and the plurality of Kurdishness.  
 
Inspired by the writings of Frantz Fanon,2 Sari Hanafi,3 and Hamid Dabashi,4 I wish 
to highlight situated perspectives in relation to the ongoing developments. I conduct a 
‘double research’5 that challenges essentialising discourses of Kurdishness, and the 
thesis builds on partial and situated knowledge, which is combined with concepts of 
contentious politics, in order to deeply explore the field of tension between top-down 
regulations and bottom-up social and political organising within the Kurdish-speaking 
community in Syria. This thesis concludes that the opportunities and potentials of 
self-organising depend exceedingly on the PYD party. Furthermore the thesis unfolds 
the embedded paradox of the idea of Kurdishness in the organising methods and 
discourses in the areas. 
 
 
Keywords: Top-down regulations; bottom-up organising; contentious politics; partial 
and situated knowledge; racialising; essentialisng discourses; PYD; Syrian Kurdish 
speaking community; Kurdishness. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Please note that on page 76, in the Appendix, I present all abbriviations used in the thesis.	  
2 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, trans. Constance Farrington (London: Penguin Books, 
2001) 
3 Sari Hanafi, ”The Arab revolutions; the emergence of a new political subjectivity,” Contemporary 
Arab Affairs 5 (2012): 198–213. 
4 Hamid Dabashi, The Arab Spring: The End of Postcolonialism (London and New York: Zed 
Books, 2012) 
5  Yasmin Gunaratnam, Researching 'Race' and Ethnicity: Methods, Knowledge and Power 
(London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2003), 35.	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1 Introduction 
In fall 2013, I worked with a Syrian civil society organisation in Gaziantep, 
Southeastern Anatolia, Turkey, and during that time formed friendships with many 
displaced Syrians. One of them is Ras,6 who consistently travels back and forth 
between Turkey and Syria. He convinced me, along with a Swedish friend, to join 
him on a visit to Syria. In December 2013, we sat out to a ten-day trip to Nap,7 
located in the areas controlled by the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD)8 in 
North Syria. During the stay we met up with the friends and family of Ras, and talked 
with many people deeply engaged in social and political organising.  
 
The ongoing Syrian uprising9 marks a new era in Syria, and in the thesis the uprising 
is used as a historical marker of before and after. In general the current developments 
are poorly documented, due to the security risks of travelling in and around Syria. 
Especially the amount of violence function as layers of exclusions, and thus strongly 
influence on individuals and groups’ possibilities of narrating the ongoing events. I 
wish to confront the exclusion by highlighting the voices of the people living in Syria. 
That is not because I consider their knowledge to be neutral, pure, or free of power 
influences, but through “partial and situated knowledge”10 I am able to ground the 
textuality of the thesis in all its complexities. Based on discussions with research 
participants from Nap, I wish to explore and document the thoughts and reflections of 
social and politically engaged members of the Kurdish-speaking community. Actors, 
whose voices easily get marginalised or lost in the public debate, despite the great 
amount of agency that drives from their sparkling “citizenry”.11 Throughout the thesis 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Ras is an anonymising name that I have made up for security purposes. As a part of general 
anonymisation I have changed the names of all persons who participate in the research, I have changed 
the name of the group that Ras is active in to the “Comrades”, and I have changed certain city names 
that could give away clues about the identity of my research participants. 
7 Nap is an anonymising name  
8 PYD is the leading Kurdish party in current Syria, and is a member of the Unions of Communities 
in Kurdistan (KCK), where also the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) is a member.  
9 I use the word “uprising” to discribe the ongoing developements in Syria. Other writers use words 
such as; revolution, civil war, or crisis, and though most of the research participants use the Arabic 
word for revolution, I use “uprising” because it has the tone of extraordinary changes that are still in 
the developing processes, which I consider in accordance with the contents of the participants 
narratives. 
10 A term coined by Donna Haraway asserting that scientific knowledge is never complete, but 
when clarifying the personal and political context research become close to an objective vision. See 
Donna Haraway, ”Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of 
Partial Perspective,” Feminist Studies 14 (1988): 575-599. 
11 Dabashi, The Arab Spring, 11-12. 
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I display differing arguments, which are both circling ongoing processes of social and 
political organising in the PYD-controlled areas,12 and interpreting the meaning of 
Kurdishness to the developments in the areas. I will shed light on undescribed 
processes of organising with high democratic potential, but also touch upon new 
forms of domination and essentialising accounts of Kurdishness, which stresses the 
area of tension between bottom-up and top-down organising.13 
 
The research questions: 
How are different forms of bottom-up political and social organising currently 
unfolding in Nap in relation to top-down approaches? 
How does sentiments of Kurdishness influence the current developments? 
 
Trough the two research questions I seek to explore the content of the conversations 
of the research participants in Nap and illuminate the fields of tension, in the same 
time as I open for de-essentialising perspectives and insights from contentious 
politics. I intend to draw a reflective14 picture of temporality, which is important for 
three different reasons: First it is important for the immediate mapping and analysing 
of the intertwined developments taking place in Syria, and in this case specifically in 
the PYD-controlled areas. Secondly for the sake of future analyses to possibly look 
back on trajectories of organising that is narrated not only from power holding 
positions. Thirdly this thesis is not at least a contribution to accounts on the 
overarching struggle between top-down approaches to power and bottom-up 
organising of situated co-determination. By emphasising the importance of writing 
and highlighting grassroots perspectives, I attempt to explore both their potentials and 
pitfalls, without romanticising them, and contribute as a critical researcher. By 
engaging in the textual production of the ongoing Syrian uprising, I unavoidably write 
myself in as a reflective part-taker. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 I call the now declared autonoumous region in North Syria, known in PYD terminology as 
Rojava (meaning the Western part of Kurdistan in Kurdish) consisting of the three cantons; Afrin, 
Kobanê and Cizîre, for the PYD-controlled areas. 
13 I consider, bottom-up organising to include forms of grassroots mobilisation or initiatives 
organised by civilians targetting societal matters, and I consider top-down organising to be 
characterised by dicision implementation in a hierarchical order, characterising the structures of 
political parties or institutions such as the police or the army, as well the idea of law implementation in 
itself. In the theory part I elaborate further. 
14 With reflective and reflexivity I mean showing consciousness to theoretical, cultural and political 
context, as well as to the relation between scholar and research participants, see Mats Alvesson and Kaj 
Sköldberg, Reflexive Methodology: New Vistas for Qualitative Research (London: Sage Publication, 
2000), 245. 
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2 Disposition 
The structure of this thesis is as follows. The Literature Review summarises the most 
important writings on Syria in relation to the Kurdish-speaking community and points 
to a strong tendency within Middle Eastern studies to mainly study power holding 
positions. The chapter functions as a historiography of reference points that map the 
complexities of the research topic.  
Subsequently my Methodology will elaborate the use of ‘double research’, oral 
history, and how the recorded conversations are grounded in this thesis. Partial and 
situated knowledge is emphasised as the epistemological point of departure and 
limitations and various obstructions based on security concerns and textual 
considerations are elaborated.  
In the Theory, the social movement synthesis of Dough McAdam et al.15 is presented 
as a backbone structure and supplemented with concepts from contentious politics16 
and relevant theories in relation to colonialism,17 authoritarianism,18 and approaches 
to mobilisation.19 The chapter follows up on the arguments outlined in both the 
Literature Review and the Methodology on how an open approach to social and 
political organising makes it possible to explore new developments, while 
essentialisms is confronted through a historical grounding. 
 
The methods and theories are then applied in the Analysis that is divided into three 
parts. Part one covers selected historical and political developments in relation to the 
Syrian uprising and political changes in the current PYD-controlled areas. In part two 
and three the discussions of the research participants on relations between bottom-up 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, ”Introduction: Opportunities, mobilizing 
structures, and framing processes – toward a synthetic, comparative perspective on social movements,” 
in Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and 
Cultural Framings, ed. Doug McAdam et al. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 1-20. 
16 Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, ”Comparative perspectives on contentious 
Politics,” in Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure, edited by Mark Irving Lichbach 
and Alan S. Zuckerman (New York: Cambrigde University Press, 2009), 260-290. 
17 Benjamin T. White, The Emergence of Minorities in the Middle East: The Politics of Community 
in French Mandate Syria (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011), and Fanon, Wretched of the 
Earth. 
18 Charles Tilly, ”War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in Bringing the State Back 
In, ed. Peter B. Evans et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 169-191 
19  Asef Bayat, Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East. (Standford: 
Standford Univerity Press, 2010); and Steven Heydemann and Reinoud Leenders, ”Popular 
Mobilization in Syria: Opportunity and Threat, and the Social Networks of the Early Risers,” 
Mediterranean Politics 17 (2012): 139-159. 
	   9	  
and top-down organising in the PYD-controlled areas are analysed. Additionally their 
perception of Kurdishness is examined.  
The Conclusion highlights three different levels of reflections that are developed 
through the thesis and how the lack of a clear differentiation between the roles of 
different elements of the PYD rule, has become its Achilles’ heel. I also conclude on 
different ways Kurdishness has been exploited for power gaining purposes, and how 
all the participants in their accounts challenge any simplified essence of Kurdishness. 
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3 Literature Review 
The following chapter introduces selected literature in the field of Middle Eastern 
studies, on Syria and the Kurdish-speaking community, which relates to the 
authoritarian methods of the Syrian regime,20 and specifically on the social and 
political organising of the Kurdish-speaking community.  
3.1 Orientalist Analyses of Syrian Developments 
The works of Nikolaos Van Dam and Patrick Seale represents a tradition of European 
academics engaged with writings on Syria that arguably belong to an orientalist 
tradition21 of understanding the “Middle East” as a stagnant region, where bottom-up 
organising is ignored and understandings of power and sectarianism are uncritically 
and discursively attached as fixed categories.22 Both scholars write about historical, 
authoritarian developments in Syria, drawing the lines from the French mandate 
period to the regime of Assad rule. Their writings are thoroughly conducted and stand 
as important documents of the historical developments of the Baath regime and the 
formation of power structures between certain minority families and the Sunni-
majority.  
3.1.2 Opportunities in Time 
While Seale and Van Dam suggest a simplistic and determined path of the Syrian 
history, historians such as Hanna Batatu, James Gelvin and Philip S. Khoury leave 
more space for ambivalence and chances of erratic outcomes of the past.23 Khoury 
and Gelvin focus on the historical roots of Arab nationalisms and both have added 
great detail to the political factionalism among the different nationalist groups in 
Syria before and during the French mandate period.24 Their documentation, together 
with the pioneering work of Hanna Batatu,25 provide historical evidence of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 I use the word regime to describe the Syrian authoritarian system ruling from Damascus in 
accordance to the word use of the participants of this research. 
21 A termed coined by Edward Said, Orientalism (London: Penguin Books, 2003). 
22 Patrick Seale, Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East (California: University of 
California Press , 1995); and Nikolaos Van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society 
Under  
Asad and the Ba'th Party (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2011). 
23 Hanna Batatu, Syria's Peasantry, the Descendants of Its Lesser Rural Notables, and Their 
Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); Philip S. Khoury,  Syria and the French 
Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism 1920-1945 (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1987); and 
James Gelvin, Divided Loyalties: Nationalism and Mass Politics in Syria at the Close of Empire 
(Berkley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1998). 
24 Khoury, French Mandate; and Gelvin, Divided Loyalties. 
25 Batatu, Syria's Peasantry. 
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political developments of nationalism and colonialism, and how they weaves together 
and provide the foundation of claims to power in Syria, which strongly effect recent 
developments.  
3.2 Authoritarian Upgrading 
The concept of an authoritarian upgrading concerns the methods, under Bashar al-
Assad, of legitimising the authoritarian position of the regime in the 21st century, and 
ward off demands of “real” democratisation.26 The changes instigated around the 
presidential transfer from Hafez to Bashar al-Assad in 2000 are described by many 
recent scholars, such as Laura Ruiz de Elvira, Tina Zintl and Bassam Haddad, as 
balancing between the building of a new “social market economy”27 that nurtured the 
ties between the regime and the crony capitalists,28 and the development of a charity 
sector, which gave an impression of a process of “modern” state development and a 
nascent civil society.29 One significant tendency of all the above-mentioned authors is 
a recurring focus on the top-down processes of the Syrian elite, a focus that this thesis 
challenges by also paying attention to bottom-up conceptions and non-elitist 
formations of contention. 
3.2.1 Expressions of Dissent 
Scholars of Middle Eastern studies such as Raymond Hinnebusch, Joe Pace and 
Jousha Landis have investigated the political responses to those political changes 
suggested above. It is generally noted that the presidential shift was first perceived as 
an initiator of change that encouraged political involvement in the “Damascus 
Spring”. However, the short-lived opening of political criticism in Syria was followed 
by persecutions, and a crackdown on the opposition – also known as the “Damascus 
Winter”.30  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Steven Heydemann, Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World (Washington: The Saban 
Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, 2007); and Line Khatib, ”Syria's Civil 
Society as a Tool for Regime Legitimacy,” in Civil society in Syria and Iran: Activism in Authoritarian 
Contexts, eds. Poul Aarts and Francesco Cavatorta (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
2013),19-39. 
27 Laura Ruiz de Elvira and Tina Zintl, eds., Civil Society and the State in Syria: The Outsourcing 
of Social Responsibility (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2012). 
28 Bassam Haddad, ” Business Associations and the New Nexus of Power in Syria,” in Civil 
Society in Syria and Iran: Activism in Athoritarian Contexts, eds. Poul Aarts and Francesco Cavatorta 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2013), 69-92. 
29 Ruiz de Elvira and Zintl, Civil Society. 
30 Joe Pace and Joshua Landis, ”The Syrian Opposition: The struggle for unity and relevance, 2003-
2008,” in Demystifying Syria, ed. Fred H. Lawson (London and Beirut: Saqi , 2009), 174-211; and 
Raymond Hinnebusch, ”Syria: from ‘Authoritarian Upgrading’ to Revolution?” International Affairs 
88 (2012): 95-113. 
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Julie Gauthier has elaborated on the 2004 Qamişlo uprising.31 This marked the most 
significant expressions of dissent in Syria since the clampdown of the Syrian Muslim 
Brotherhood and the massacre of Hama in 1982.32 During the Qamişlo uprising, 
hundred thousands of people, especially members of the Kurdish-speaking 
community in Syria went to the streets, several were killed and hundreds were injured 
and arrested.33 
3.3 The Kurdish-speaking Community 
Before the Qamişlo uprising of 2004, very little was written about the Kurdish-
speaking community in Syria. The literature covering Kurdish-speaking communities 
generally focuses on Iraq and Turkey. These are the two countries with the largest 
Kurdish-speaking populations and where violent resistance has been unleashed.34 
The historian, David McDowall, and Human Rights organisations’ writings about the 
community in Syria, mainly focused on the Human Rights violations and the 
discriminatory laws of the Syrian state. In Syria the suppression of ethnic Kurdish 
expressions most significantly began with the 1962 census, which stripped a large part 
of the Kurdish-speaking community of Syrian citizenship. The Kurdish-speaking 
community has since been divided in three parts: the Syrian citizens, the “foreigners” 
holding a special identity card, and the “maktoumeen”35 without any form of legal 
documents. A significant amount of the research has been devoted to the regime’s 
Arabisation policies of creating an “Arab-belt” in the border areas to Turkey and the 
implemented land reforms that redistributed land and transferred Arab families to the 
areas mainly inhabited by the Kurdish-speaking community.36  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Julie Gauthier, ”The 2004 Events in al-Qamishli: Has the Kurdish question erupted in Syria?” in 
Demystifying Syria, ed. Fred H. Lawson, trans. Diana V. Galbraith (London: Saqi, 2009), 153-173 
32 Batatu, Syria's Peasantry, 260-275. 
33 Amnesty International “Syria: Kurds in the Syrian Arab Republic One Year After the March 
2004 Events.” Amnesty International. March 10, 2005. Accessed August 8, 2014, 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE24/002/2005/en/97a2be2b-d539-11dd-8a23-
d58a49c0d652/mde240022005en.pdf, and Gauthier, ”al-Qamishli,” 153-173. 
34 David McDowall, The Kurds: A Nation denied. (London: Minorities Rights Publications, 1992); 
Phillip G. Kreyenbroek and Stefan Sperl, eds., The Kurds: A contemporary overview (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1992); and Gerard Chaliand, ed., A People without a Country: The Kurds and 
Kurdistan, trans. Michael Pallis (New York: Olive Branch Press, 1993). 
35 Meaning “hidden” in Arabic 
36 David McDowall, The Kurds of Syria (London: Kurdish Human Rights Project, 1998); Middle 
East Watch. “Syria unmasked: The suppression of human rights by the Asad regime.” (Yale University 
Press, 1991); Human Rights Watch, “Syria: The Price of Dissent.” Human Rights Watch 7 (1995); and 
Human Rights Watch, “Syria: The silenced Kurds,” Human Rights Watch 8 (1996): 1-49.  
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After the Qamişlo uprising, more writings were dedicated the Syrian Kurdish-
speaking community, and Harriet Montgomery,37 Kerim Yildiz,38 and Jordi Tejel,39 
all authored books on the Syrian-Kurdish history, on the methods of suppression by 
the regime and on how the Syrian Kurdish-speaking community has been struggling 
for the rights of exercising Kurdish culture.40 Moreover, Human rights organisations 
both from within Syria 41  and internationally 42  started highlighting cases of 
persecution of members of the Kurdish-speaking community. 
3.3.1 The Syrian Kurdish-speaking Community 
The work by Jordi Tejel contributes to the literature about the Syrian Kurdish-
community with both anthropological and social-political reflections on the 
developments of the minority.43 Tejel points out that the Kurdish identity as a 
minority was developed during the French mandate period and that the political 
culture was built on a non-violent tactic. In his book, Tejel shows eloquently how the 
Kurdish identity always has been one of many identities among the Kurdish-speaking 
population, but has been politically emphasised in certain periods of time.44 
In 2014, Harriet Allsopp published her book about the Kurdish nationalist party 
movement in Syria.45 The book covers events of Kurdish mobilisation from the 
Ottoman times during the French mandate until today. Her arguments, on how the 
power struggle has developed in the Kurdish elite, and how the regime’s 
criminalisation of Kurdish identity has made its recognition become the centre of the 
political struggle,46 are of special interest to this thesis. Despite the facts that Allsopp 
incorporates interviews with members of the Kurdish-speaking community and that 
different forms of political organisation are covered, she does not provide space for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Harriet Montgomery is an author pseydonym. She is today writing under her real name, Harriet 
Allsopp. Harriet Montgomery, The Kurds of Syria: An Existence Denied, (Berlin: Europaisches 
Zentrum fur kurdische Studien, 2005). 
38 Kerim Yildiz, The Kurds in Syria (London and Ann Arbor: Pluto Press, 2005). 
39 Jordi Tejel, Syria's Kurds: History, politics and soceity, trans. Emily Welle and Jane Welle 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2009). 
40 Montgomery, Kurds of Syria; Yildiz, Kurds in Syria; and Tejel, Syria's Kurds. 
41  Kurd Watch “About us.” Accessed August 6, 2014, 
http://www.kurdwatch.org/index.php?cid=182&z=en. 
42 Irin, “Syria: For many Kurds, statelessness remains a way of life,” November 20,  
2005. Accessed August 6, 2014, http://www.irinnews.org/report/25713/syria-for-many-kurds-
statelessness-remains-a-way-of-life; and Human Rights Watch, Group Denial: Repression of Kurdish 
Political and Cultural Rights in Syria. New York: Human Rights Watch, 2009. 
43 Tejel, Syria's Kurds, 8-37. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Harriet Allsopp, The Kurds of Syria: Political Parties and Identities in the Middle East (London 
and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2014). 
46 Ibid, 17-44. 
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alternative political organisation since the foundation of the first Kurdish party in 
1957. 
3.4 Social organising and the Syrian Uprising 
Steven Hydemann and Reinoud Leenders explore the beginning of the Syrian 
uprising, and represent a more open approach of uncovering networks of dissent in 
the Middle Eastern and North African context. 47  They argue that the special 
combinations of social organising in Dar’a, and the socio-geographical circumstances 
shared by the citizens in the cities that quickly followed, constituted conditions for an 
effective uprising. 48  In their opinion, social mobilisation theory of threat and 
opportunity is very relevant in the Syrian case, since the constellation of under-
researched networks highly involved in the uprising, combined with the coercive 
methods of the regime comprised a special setting leading to the mobilisation of the 
people.49 
3.4.1 Developments in the PYD-controlled Areas 
Research platforms and recently published books on the developments in the PYD-
controlled areas struggle to explore the newly established structures of power and 
identity formations. Human Rights Watch and International Crisis Group dedicate 
reports to the internal political struggle in the Kurdish areas, while problematizing the 
current ruling methods of the PYD party.50 The same focus can be tracked in recent 
published writings of Harriet Allsopp, Eva Savelsberg and Jordi Tejel, who mainly 
explore the elite relations between the Kurdish party leadership, the Syrian regime 
and the regime opposition, and include strong critical points regarding the ruling 
method of the PYD party.51  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Heydemann and Leenders, ”Popular Mobilization,” 139-159. 
48 Ibid 
49 Ibid, 141-143. 
50 Human Rights Watch, Under Kurdish Rule: Abuses in PYD-run Enclaves of Syria (USA: Human 
Rights Watch, 2014); International Crisis group, Flight of Icarus? The PYD’s Precarious Rise in Syria 
(Brussels: ICG, 8 May, 2014); and International Crisis Group, Syria's Kurds: A struggle Within a 
Struggle (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2013). 
51 Eva Savelsberg and Jordi Tejel, ”The Syrian Kurds in Transition to Somewhere,” in The Kurdish 
Spring: Geopolitical Changes and the Kurds, eds. Mohammed M. A. Ahmed and Michael Gunter 
(Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 2013), 189-217; and Harriet Allsopp, ”The Kurdish Autonomy Bid in 
Syria: Challenges and Reactions,” in The Kurdish Spring: Geopolitical Changes and the Kurds, ed. 
Mohammed M. A. Ahmed and Michael M. Gunter (Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 2013), 218-249. 
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Most recently, in relation to the struggle of Kobanê,52 more focus has been dedicated 
the organising in the PYD-controlled areas. Dilar Dirik and Joost Jongerden are two 
scholars who have elaborated on the practices of Democratic Confederalism/ 
Democratic Autonomy 53  and the Kurdish women’s movement 54  in the PYD-
controlled areas. Their optimistic interpretation of the developments, along with the 
more critical approaches mentioned above will be included in the analysis in relation 
to the expressions of lived experiences of the research participants. 
3.5 Social organising and a Bottom-Up Approach 
As have been pointed to in this section, literature on Syria and the Kurdish-speaking 
community are generally marked by a macro-political focus. Considering the writings 
on the Kurdish-speaking community, the social organising mainly includes elitist 
formations in the Kurdish party movement, and essentialising accounts on 
Kurdishness are not clearly problematised. 
 
The Syrian uprising marks changes in the possibilities of engaging in politics of 
dissent. In order to enhance the developments in Syria before the uprising as well as 
for now, I will argue, along the lines of Heydemann and Leenders, that a more open 
approach to what can be included as forms of organising is useful to understand 
nuances of the current uprising.  
While the literature on Syria is plentiful, when it comes to how the strictly controlled 
civil society have had an upgrading effect on the authoritarianism in Syria,55 it 
however lacks accounts on how social and political organising has taken shape in the 
countryside or the smaller cities, as well as through irregular formations such as 
criminal or migrant networks, as discussed by Hydemann and Leenders, or even 
through youth networks organised within the Red Crescent, universities,56 or local 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Kobanê is a city, and one out of the three cantons in North Syria under PYD control, that has 
been under increased attack by the Islamist militant group, Islamic State (IS), since its militant 
advances of June 2014 in Iraq and later also in Syria. 
53 Joost Jongerden, “#1. Stateless Democracy: The Revolution in Rojava Kurdistan [part 1],” 
Vimeo video, 1:06:34-1:31:00, posted by “De Balie,” October 21, 2014. Accessed October 23, 2014, 
https://vimeo.com/109625788. 
54 Dilar Dirik, “Stateless Democracy: How the Kurdish Women Movement Liberated Democracy 
from the State,” Vimeo video, 29:30, posted by “New World Summit,” September 30, 2014. Accessed 
October 27, 2014, https://vimeo.com/107639261. 
55 For more details see: Roschanack Shaery-Eisenlohr, ”From Subjects to Citizens? Civil Society 
and the Internet in Syria,” Middle East Critique 20 (2011): 127-138; Khatib, ”Syria's Civil Society,” 
19-39; and Ruiz de Elvira and Zintl, Civil Society, 5-64. 
56 Syrian activists I have spoken to use/used their skills and network established through university 
and volunteering with the Red Crescent during the revolution. 
	   16	  
neighborhoods. 57  Building on historical accounts and sociological studies on 
racialising developments; this thesis seeks to contribute with an ethnographical 
account focusing on different shapes of organising in the PYD-controlled areas, as 
well as on their differences in ideology and practices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 The research participants mention organising protest of the Syrian uprising within their local 
neighborhoods. 
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4 Methodology 
When exploring recent developments in Syria, and specifically the PYD-controlled 
areas, my interests are divided between interpreting the developments reflected in the 
lived experiences of the participants, as well as critically investigating the underlying 
structures depending on spatial, temporal, and textual connections in accordance to a 
‘double research’.58  
4.1 Mixed Methodologies 
I am inspired by a reflexive methodology as suggested by Mats Alvesson and Kaj 
Sköldberg,59 which mixes four different methodological approaches: “data-oriented” 
methods, hermeneutics, critical theory, and postmodernism/poststructuralism. Their 
methodology is rather ambitious, and in this thesis project, I only concur to their 
general approach to empirical material, though I repeatedly touch upon elements of all 
four methodologies. As they suggest, rather than attempting to ratify a sort of 
interpreted reality, I wish to explore the recorded discussions from Nap in ways that 
generate “creative ideas”.60  
The drive to triangulate methods comes from insights questioning the knowledge-
claims of research and sciences. Anthropology, ethnography and the field of Middle 
Eastern studies all have shared roots in colonialism. According to Lila Abu-Lughod, 
the relation between knowledge and power shows itself through segmentary truth-
claims that in the academic tradition have been used to generate quintessential 
narratives on subjects from the Middle East and the North African region,61 which is 
also pointed to in the literature review. Along with the arguments of Abu-Lughod, this 
thesis attempts to challenge simplified conclusions and on the contrary engage with 
the field in a critical and reflexive manner.  
4.1.1 Double Research 
In order to comprehend the ambiguities of a racialised field such as studies on the 
Kurdish-speaking communities, Yasmin Gunaratnam suggests ‘double research’ as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58  Yasmin Gunaratnam, Researching 'Race' and Ethnicity: Methods, Knowledge and Power 
(London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2003), 35. 
59 Alvesson and Sköldberg, ”Reflexive Methodology”. 
60 Ibid, 241. 61	  Lila Abu-Lughod, “Anthropology’s Orient: The Boundaries of Theory on the Arab World,” in 
Theory Politics and the Arab World: Critical Responses, ed. Hisham Sharabi (New York and London: 
Routledge, 1990), 94. 
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tool to confront essentialism by exploring the multiplicity in situated expressions,62 
resulting in a circular interplay of emic and etic approaches. The double research 
concept mainly combines elements of postmodernism, postcolonialism and a sort of 
reflective interpretive framework, which allows exploring the heterogeneity in 
expressions by any individual or social group, pointing to connections between 
societal structures and formations of identities as well as exploring the substance of 
social differences.63  
 
The reflective approach challenges the current hegemonic discourse on the 
developments in Syria, which most often tap into claims of sectarian essence. 
Specifically when writing about the Kurdish-speaking community one needs to be 
aware of homogenous ethno-Kurdish constructions in the same time as not appearing 
to eradicate expressions of cultural belonging. This complex balancing is backed by 
the research participants’ insistence to situate their reflections in historic and 
contextual references.  
It further affects the wording of the thesis, where I integrate the terminology of the 
participants e.g. the city names are referred to by their Kurdish names such as Kobanê 
instead of Ayn al-Arab, and special care is put into the wording when describing 
members of e.g. the Kurdish-speaking community in order not to contribute to an 
essentialised categorisation. 
4.1.2 Oral History 
Throughout the stay in Nap, I was inspired by the open-ended conversational style of 
oral history. Oral history method focuses on first-hand sources to historical processes, 
which privileges narratives that do not represent the most powerful position in time.64 
It encourages “shared authority” between researcher and participants, and is thereby 
linked to alethic hermeneutic perspectives.65 Likewise, oral history is also connected 
to postmodernism and poststructuralism, since the production of knowledge is 
considered to be fluid interactive processes of shared authorship.66  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Gunaratnam, Researching 'Race', 35. 
63 Ibid, 49-50. 
64  Patricia Leavy, Oral History: Understanding Qualitative Research (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 8-17. 
65 Eva M. McMahan, ”A conversational Analytic Approach to Oral History Interviewing,” in 
Handbook of Oral History, ed. Thomas L. Charlton et al. (Lanham: Altamira Press, 2006), 338. 
66 Leavy, Oral History, 8. 
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4.1.3 A Grounded Method 
To support the reflective approaches of double research and oral history methods, I 
have grounded my analysis in the words of the participants. In order to do so I have 
transcribed and translated the more than ten hours recorded discussions, between the 
participants from Arabic to English, but for security and ethical reasons I have only 
attached the selected transcription parts that I refer to in the thesis.  
To uphold reliability, with the support of the coding program of Maxqda, I have 
conducted a coding process of consistently comparing codes and data. According to 
Kathy Charmaz,67 such a process is especially useful when engaging with social 
justice inquiry. I ended up with four themes (1) contextualisation, (2) comments on 
organising, (3) strategies of change, and (4) expressions of identities. All the 
participants explore the four themes, and the theme division makes it possible to find 
both similarities as well as differences in their words.  
 
In order to create a meaningful structure for applying theory, the four themes are 
applied to the synthesis of social movements theory of Dough McAdam et al,68 and 
together with a reflexive analytical approach, it provides the backbone of the writing 
process. The thematic setting provides the foundation to unfold the different 
directions that the arguments of the participants take in an ethical and secure way, 
which makes it both valid and reliable for both outside readers as well as for insiders. 
4.2 Ethics and Security Considerations intertwined 
Evidently, a major part of the challenge of writing and conducting research in current 
Syria, results from the rapidly changing security situation. The local situation needs to 
be carefully studied, the travel plans thought through, and during the visit the security 
risks need to be discussed continuously with the participants. The security concerns 
have thereby been a part of an interrelated process with the ethical considerations in 
order to equally privilege both.69 While conducting research in Nap the interrelation 
of both aspects affected the whole process and determined how I approached the 
participants, how I managed my position in the discussions that I recorded, and how I 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Kathy Charmaz, ”Grounded Theory Methods in Social Justice Research,” in The Sage Handbook 
of Qualitative Research, eds. Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln, 4th ed. (Los Angeles: Sage 
Publications Inc., 2011), 367-370. 
68 McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, ”Introduction,” 1-20. 
69 Veronika Bilger and Ilse Van Liempt, ”Introduction,” in The Ethics of Migration Research 
Methodology: Dealling with Vulnerable Immigrants, eds. Veronika Bilger and Ilse Van Liempt 
(Brighton and Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2009), 13. 
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have been reflecting upon the material in the analysis. The ethical guidelines offered 
by universities are very basic. While I strictly follow the ethical guidelines provided 
by CMES making sure that the research participants know the terms of the thesis, I 
have felt the need to supplement them, in accordance to the reflections of Veronika 
Bilger and Ilse Van Liempt, by exploring “common methodological approaches 
across disciplines and across subject areas”.70 
4.3 Partial and situated Knowledge 
The methodological choices and ethical considerations are inspired by an idea of 
learning and producing text, from what Donna Haraway calls “partial and situated 
knowledge”.71 This approach gives space to multiplicity and critical thinking at the 
same time, and it mirrors the non-linear shapes of temporality that permeates the 
current developments in Syria. ‘Partial and situated knowledge’ seems to apply not 
only to the discussions of the participants in Nap, but also epistemologically to how 
research on Syria can be done during such an intense and difficult time. As an 
outsider writing and participating in discussions, I inevitably become entangled in a 
specific, complicated and politically affected situation. I find the humbleness of the 
reflexive analysing form inspiring, which instead of being a tool of freezing the 
fluctuating conversations in rigorous interpretations frames, contains the possibility of 
exploring the contextual dependent developments in all its complexities. 
4.3.1 Situational Intuition and Participant Introduction 
The Kurdish-speaking community that I was introduced to in Nap, I will argue, can 
generally be divided into three different groups that interlink on various levels. This 
division resonates with the political analyses of the participants as well as with the 
literature covering the developments. The first group concerns the supporters of the 
PYD, who in this thesis are represented by the ideas and words of Daf from the 
Asayish72 office; the second group are the supporters of the Kurdish National Council 
(KNC), who are represented by Zaza and Daw who are members of the Kurdistan 
Democratic Party of Syria (KDPS),73 and Abu Ras, who is a member of the Kurdish 
Democratic Union Party in Syria (Yekiti party); the last group considers the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Ibid, 14. 
71 Haraway, ”Situated Knowledges,” 575-599. 
72 Kurdish for security forces and they function as the police in the PYD-controlled areas. 73	  The KDPS is also known as “al-Party” among the Syrian Kurdish-speaking community.	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revolutionaries,74 who are not party-affiliated but have continuously taken an active 
part in organising the Syrian uprising from 2011 and forward. They are represented 
by Zaid, who is a leading member of the Kurdish Youth Movement (TCK), and by Im 
Nub, Abu Nub and Ras from the Comrades. 
 
Through Ras, who functioned as a gatekeeper, I was introduced to the representatives 
of the three different groups. The research project thereby includes recorded 
conversations and discussions with research participants, who have different political 
positions and engagements in terms of the Syrian uprising and the PYD-controlled 
areas, but clearly express positions that transgress the group-division. I include eight 
participants who all had the possibility to thoroughly develop their arguments through 
one or several group talks. They are all men, except for one woman, and their ages 
range from the late twenties to the beginning of the early sixties. 
4.3.2 Discussions in Nap 
The thesis project is permeated by the personality and drive of Ras. Without him it 
would not have been possible to travel to the area, or meet any of the participants. His 
eagerness to share his reflections on the current situation, and led us partake in multi-
layered and genuine discussions between him and his friends, as well as his will to 
introduce us to his political opponents, shaped the foundation of the thesis. The 
participants showed great trust by allowing the discussions to be recorded and used 
for academic analyses. All the talks took place in group-settings, where all the 
participants knew each other, and gave input, when they wanted to.  
 
The friends and family of Ras, who are either part of the KNC or are revolutionaries, 
have a strong emphasis on the complications in the current power division in the area, 
and how it affects the social and political organsing in the area and the negotiations of 
Kurdishness. Due to the personal knowledge the participants have about each other, 
they challenged each other’s different positions in an empathetic but thoughtful 
manner that only an insider can master. In my experience the participants also paid 
attention to give each other space to talk, and when they felt like it, invited me into 
the discussion. The transformed oral history group method certainly affected the 
conversations, since the participants had to relate to each other’s points and positions.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 I call them revolutionaries because they are supporters of what they consider to be the Syrian 
revolution.  
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When talking to PYD members, I would be more careful in my way of formulating 
contributions to the conversations, in order not to create problems to non-PYD 
members in Nap, to whom critical remarks could fall back on. Though the PYD 
member, Daf from the Asayish, was very friendly, and dedicated many hours of his 
time to share his ideas and thoughts on the situation, the conversations never crossed 
the boundaries of reluctance. Likely this is related to us only meeting him once, and 
additionally that we were the guests of Ras. Even though Ras never uttered any 
critical remarks in the presence of PYD members, they know of his political 
affiliation with the Syrian uprising. Another aspect is based in Daf from the Asayish 
representing a kind of structural setting as the PYD police force. This position 
affected the conversations that appeared bound by a fixed political belonging, in the 
sense that the references were built upon the ideological basis of the PYD and 
particularly Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and Abdullah Öcalan. Arguably this sort 
of party representation caused a layered filter within his reflections, which also the 
different KNC party members tapped into during their conversations.  
4.3.3 How can I describe the Taste of Banana if I did not eat It?75 	  
The open approach of the group oral history method did not prevent the participants 
from responding to my presence. During the conversations, some of the participants 
directly referred to me representing a European heritage, and in their eyes it seemed to 
place me as incapable of fully grasping their situation.76  
All the conversations were conducted in Arabic, which is neither the mother tongue of 
the participants, nor is it mine. Among the Kurdish-speaking community the Arabic 
language has a complex representation in itself, since it is a colonising language in the 
sense that it has been forced upon the Kurdish-speaking community, e.g. by being the 
only legal language for schooling in Syria. However, during my stay in Nap, it offered 
the platform for us being able to communicate, since none of the participants were 
comfortable speaking English, and I am only able to express a few polite phrases in 
Kurmanji.77 In this sense, the language came to represent a sort of compromise, where 
the research participants had the upper hand and when I explained that I speak a 
reasonable Arabic, due to years spent in Palestine and Syria, it gave an impression of 	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77 The Kurdish dialect spoken in Syria. 
	   23	  
me as an empathic person. Though it is easy gained credit, this personal history 
arguably gives me insights to what occupation and suppression means.  
4.4 Obstructions in Anonymity and Trust 
With the benefit of hindsight, the way the conversations took shape was unavoidably 
affected by my outsider curiosity and eagerness to understand. Combined with the 
generosity, compassion and idealism of all the participants, the conversations severely 
transgressed any serious concerns of security. Though security issues formed a natural 
part of almost all discussions. So while many researchers discuss ways of winning 
participants’ trust,78 the great challenge of this thesis seems to be much more about 
how to handle the trust that was given.  
 
Phillip Bourgois discusses how participatory research stretches the idea of informed 
consent, and how the idea of building rapport is a way of making people forget that 
they participate in research. He argues that politics and power are omnipresent, 
though however sometimes occur academically disguised, and it is important to 
rethink the political spectra to support the voices of the suppressed.79  
 
In the case of this thesis, the dilemma of unequal positions between researcher and 
participants unfolds through the matrix of security concerns and the bias of 
experiencing the Nap area with the guidance of Ras. To uphold reliability in the 
writing processes I have attempted to approach these biases by follow the guiding 
principal of Faye Ginsburg, who suggests a clear differentiation between the voices of 
the anthropologist and the participants performed as a dialogue that makes it possible 
for readers to follow the arguments and participate in the process of interpretation.80  
 
The obstruction and dilemma twined between the wish to raise multiple voices and 
build upon a partial and situated knowledge, while working within a life-threatening 	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reality, caused a need to take every imaginable step to secure the safety of the 
participants.  
The use of anonymity is widely discussed, as pointed out by Jan Nespor81 a degree of 
situatedness is lost, when anonymising places and persons, which I also find 
problematic. Charlotte Jacobsen and Katrine Johansen, who conduct research in the 
health sector, add another set of arguments. In their experiences, the anonymising of 
places and names might be sufficient for distracting the “outer world”, but in order to 
adequately disguise markers for insiders, more radical methods need to be 
considered.82 Jacobsen and Johansen tackle the dilemma between, what they call the 
“plight of conveying knowledge” and the “duty of confidentiality”, in two different 
ways. Johansen chooses to leave out the most sensitive part of her material, and 
Jacobsen uses a method that she calls “working with collages”, where parts of the 
information that is received through the ethnographic research, are included in a part 
of the written text, where it is not directly referring to a certain person.83 
 
The transformation of lived experiences into interpretation processes and textuality 
disturbs the context of the expressions no matter how it is conducted. Thus for ethical 
and security reasons I have applied both anonymisation and a combination of the 
methods suggested by Johansen and Jacobsen. Most places and all participants, and in 
a very few incidences references to certain events and groups have been anonymised. 
Though the different parts of the PYD-controlled areas have locally bound histories of 
dissent, it is still a relatively small area, with very similar political divisions. What is 
lost by the anonymising method, I hope is gained by the reflexive approach.  
4.5 Limitations in Security and Textuality 
In April 2014 I tried to return to the Nap area in order to pursue the ideas of shared 
authorship, suitable for the oral history approach. The main idea was to repeatedly 
include the participants in more group in-depth discussions, specifically in relation to 
the interpretation of the first recorded discussions. Due to a changed security 
situation, the attempt failed. The unsecure situation in Nap that required interrelated 	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security concerns, combined with the time limitations of the visit, strongly collides 
with the very personal and trust-dependent approach of oral history method. The fact 
that all conversations were conducted as group talks is a significant break with the 
conventional oral history method. 84 
The conditions of the research context made me prioritise a style that was as 
comfortable as possible for the research participants, which the informal setting of a 
group conversation confirmed. Even though I did not have the possibility to conduct a 
full-scale oral history project, writing from a partial and situated knowledge 
perspective has been the main priority of the thesis. The thesis project is naturally 
influenced by the Arabic and Kurdish languages, appearances of gender and origin, 
and security obstructions towards the possibilities of mobility.  
Due to the open interactive approach, the participants had the possibilities to discuss 
what they considered crucial in relation to the recent developing situation. The PYD-
controlled areas count with a mixed population, but the participants of this research 
are all members of the Kurdish-speaking community, which might affect the framing 
of Kurdishness. Through the grounded method and the epistemological view on 
research based on empirical data as suitable for generating new ideas, I have found 
trust in the reflexive double research approach, a method, which I consider to resonate 
with the common goal of the research participants. The reflexive double research 
approach generally challenges the construction of a simplistic, racialising, and often 
exploitative narrative of the developing situation in Syria. 
Interestingly enough, the coding of the discussions revealed, that even though the 
participants come from different political affiliations and positions in society, they 
circled very similar topics and to a large extend solutions as well, without being led 
by a structured interview guide.85 
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5 Theory 
As the backbone structure of the thesis I apply the social movement synthesis of 
Dough McAdam et al., which includes three different approaches to social 
movements theory: (1) political opportunities, (2) mobilizing structures, and (3) 
framing processes.86 I consolidate the synthesis in a theoretical mix of concepts from 
contentious politics, postmodern and critical reflexive perspectives. This approach 
jointly provides the basis for examining the empirical grounded themes in the lights of 
structures and processes of social and political organising in the PYD-controlled 
areas, as well as the negotiations of developing expressions of Kurdishness.  
5.1 Contentious Politics 
Social movement theory, or the more recent approach of contentious politics, provides 
useful concepts for analysing social and political organising. Two aspects of 
contentious politics are important to stress: (1) the approach makes it possible to 
include different shapes of dissent, from violent to non-violent and from strictly 
organised movements to loose networks, and (2) social and political organising is not 
supposed to be analysed as outstanding single events, but as parts of historical 
processes of formations of dissent consisting of different mechanism, whose content 
might change through time and space.  
McAdam et al. consider five mechanisms important variables of contentious 
processes: brokerage, identity shift, co-optation, diffusion and ‘repression and 
facilitation’.87 The mechanisms and processes of social organising can, usefully be put 
into a comparative framework,88 which might help to clarify, what challenges certain 
mobilising methods, as well as how mobilisation is connected to processes of shaping 
e.g. expressions of Kurdishness. The above-mentioned concepts are helpful to 
understand why certain types of organising work out, since the mechanisms are 
indicators of what kind of compromises are necessary in order to build a growing 
movement, as well as to understand why demobilisation or non-mobilisation most 
often becomes the case. 
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5.2 Political Opportunities 
A setting of ‘repression or facilitation’ provides the foundation of the opportunities of 
politics of dissent, and a divided power center, political openness, instability, or 
external alliances affect the possibilities of social organising.89Arguably, the two most 
widely debated prospects of the uprisings, which began in 2010 and 2011 in the 
Middle East and North Africa, in relation to ‘repression and facilitation’, are the 
repressiveness of the authoritarian setting of the regional regimes, and the facilitation 
provided by the platform of new media. 
5.2.1 Media Opportunities 
Many scholars have pointed to the importance of the new technologies of satellite 
television, Internet, and especially social media to the uprisings. These might be 
considered new platforms for connecting people, and thus as platforms for expressing 
dissent. It has also been pointed out, that the technologies only provide a tool, and 
what remains decisive, is how they are incorporated in the culture of dissent.90 
Derek Gregory analyses the influence of social media in the Egyptian uprising.91 He 
argues that it was the combination of the use of digital platforms along with the 
physical manifestations in the streets that had the mobilising effect, which eventually 
toppled the regime. 
Interestingly, the research participants of this thesis do not discuss the significance of 
social media in their conversations. It might be a coincidence, or it could be indicators 
of the new technologies are tools, which are used by all the different parts in Syria, 
from the regime to the revolutionaries. While the tools played an important role in the 
beginning of the uprising for the actual organising of non-violent manifestation, it 
now seems to be more of a tool for online-based activities such as media-campaigns.  
5.2.2 Opportunities and Authoritarianisms 
The most reoccurring topic related to the hindrance of political opportunities for any 
sort of organising in Syria seems to be perceptions of authoritarian methods. As 
elaborated by David Romano, Steven Heydemann and Reinoud Leenders, 
authoritarian violence can actually provide the foundation of mobilization,92 and the 	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snowball effect of falling dictators in other parts of the Middle East and North Africa, 
was in Syria perceived as a concrete political opportunity.93  
In this sense, the Syrian uprising indicates a new era causing a divided power center, 
which in the beginning fostered a more prosperous ground for expressions of dissent. 
However due to the militant turn of the uprising, it eventually limited any other 
expressions than the armed struggle. 
As elaborated in the literature review, the authoritarian techniques of the Syrian 
regime have functioned through various suppressive means. It has generated deep-
rooted fear in the people, and constructed what James Gelvin terms a ‘coup-proofed’ 
system.94 The techniques of authoritarianism have even been expanded during the 
Syrian uprising, both in the use of violence and discursive manipulations from all 
sides.  
Charles Tilly argues that states are constituted of war making, state making, 
extraction, and protection.95 Arguably the balance between the four elements is 
decisive for the type of authority that is shaped, and civil resistance is critical in terms 
of rights secured for the citizens. Recently established states, such as Syria, which 
came out of former colonised areas, suffer from the lack of division between the army 
and the state-rulers, which provide the condition for authoritarianism. The four 
elements are discussed and elaborated by the research participants, and in relation to 
the recent literature on the developments in the region and the PYD-controlled areas, I 
will explore new patterns of authoritarianisms that arguably emerge. 
5.3 Mobilisation and Demobilisation 
The Kurdish-speaking community in Syria has been involved in processes of social 
and political organising since the time of the Ottoman Empire. Arguably, the 
mobilising platform is built upon the clarification of systemic features, which makes it 
possible to break with the interpretation of suppression as an isolated experience.96 
Even though organising of the Kurdish-speaking community have taken various turns, 
there have been common challenges from internal elitist power struggles, to the 
handling of the authoritarian violence from the Syrian regime.97 	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As outlined in the literature review, Heydemann and Leenders argue that the ‘early 
risers’ in Syria built on their social networks involving amongst others tribes, 
criminal, and migrant networks.98 Their suggestions for including new sorts of 
accumulative networks fits the approach of contentious politics, which analytically 
opens up for considerations of new understandings of social organising and its 
potentials of gaining influence. This sort of fluid resistance perspective collides with a 
binary division between e.g. bottom-up and top-down organising, though arguably 
when looking at it as a field of tension, the division clarifies both overlapping and 
contradicting aspects. 
Brokerage and diffusion are considered two mechanisms within contentious politics 
that contribute to an upward scale-shift of social organising.99 While polarisation 
and/or co-optation, which often relates to institutionalisation of a movements or parts 
of it, have demobilising effects, as well as escalations in external suppressive 
methods, such as increased use of violence.100 Theoretically and in agreement with 
the argument of Robin D. G. Kelly, less successful but visionary shapes of organising 
are considered of socio-political importance, due to their capabilities to inspire and 
affect visions of change.101  
5.3.1 Movements, Non-movements and ‘Free-Riders’ 
The possibilities of unregulated public performances have, in the Syrian context, been 
limited by the authoritarian methods of the regime, though it has encouraged other 
shapes of collective organising. The notion of “everyday resistance” was coined by 
James C. Scott who conducted ethnographical studies of the micro-politics of 
peasants in Malaysia, and elaborate on how they resist external dominance.102 Though 
the notion has been criticised for romanticising resistance,103 since the limits for what 
can be considered resistance are blurred, it provides a foundation for exploring what 
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Asef Bayat calls the “non-movement”.104 In his studies of social change in the Middle 
Eastern region, and especially within authoritarian regimes, he notes that the 
foundation of the organisational power of disruption is a challenge, and it is therefore 
necessary to search creatively for expressions of dissent.  
 
Jordi Tejel argues that while the government in Damascus encouraged assimilation of 
their Kurdish “clients”, the majority of the Kurdish-speaking community has chosen a 
strategy of “dissimulation”, a sort of hidden dissent ready to be ignited.105 The idea of 
dissimulation is arguably incorporable to Bayats notion of street politics, which has a 
double theoretical connotation, since it both applies to the everyday practices of 
challenging the state regulatory boundaries, as well as to the extra-ordinary event of 
public expressions of dissent.106 The concept seems to encompass the uprisings in the 
Middle Eastern region as sort of extended “collective actions”.  
Asef Bayat argues that there is a great difference between the exceptional scale of an 
uprising and the capabilities required for establishing an alternative governing control 
of power. The concept of ‘free riders’ covers opportunistic organisations such as the 
Muslim Brotherhood, who managed to reach power, even though they did not directly 
participate or contribute as an organisation to the uprising.107 In Syria, this is the case 
of most of the opposition based in Turkey, including the Muslim Brotherhood, and 
arguably also the case of the leading parties in the PYD-controlled areas. It is worth 
noting, that the concept of ‘free-riders’ does not relate to how deeply representative 
either the risers or the “old” party structures are in terms of popularity. Which are 
sentiments that are much more difficult to comprehend, since such sentiments might 
change fast and depend on access to resources. 
5.4 Framing Processes ‘Beyond Identity’ 
Framing processes are relevant when studying social organising since the ideological 
narrative of a movement functions as the joint between political opportunities and 
mobilisation structures, and thus serve to charge processes of dissent with meaning.108 
When engaging in the academic mapping processes of the Syrian Kurdish-speaking 	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community, additionally, “framing” has a meta-relevance, considering the way a 
racialised field of Kurdishness is approached and discursively reframed in this case 
through the practice of ‘double research’.109  
When identity formations are related to politics of contention, it often emphasises and 
encourages certain discursive formations of identity. Identity-shifts and boundary 
activation can thereby have strong mobilising effects,110 though every person or group 
are always full of multiple and ambiguous identity expressions. The theoretical 
purpose, as elaborated by writers such as Stuart Hall,111 is to dislocate the subject in 
the sense that it is no longer identity, which is the object of study, but instead the 
relation between expressions of identities and the framing practices of social and 
political organising. In this sense, I seek an approach ‘beyond identity’, both when it 
comes to confronting essentialist framings of Kurdishness by connecting them to 
mobilising or political purposes, and engaging with the participants’ heterogeneous 
expressions of lived experiences of Kurdishness. 
5.4.1 Culture, Politics and Power 
Kurdish nationalism is one of the main framing processes of the Kurdish-speaking 
community. It contains the highly charged combination of culture and politics, which 
can be expounded from the primordial approach that considers a given population’s 
‘identity’ a naturalistic and inherit composition of the nation,112 to the nation as an 
‘imagined community’, whose boundaries are determined by the community’s sense 
of belonging and cohesion.113 In the analysis part the delicate intertwinement of 
culture and politics will be investigated, as well as the divergences between political 
framings and political practices.  
Franz Fanon’s perceptions, of the exploitative position of the nationalist bourgeoisies 
in Algeria114 are of certain relevance in relation to processes of framings and power 
formations in the PYD-controlled areas. Similar to Asef Bayat, Fanon considers the 
nationalist bourgeoisie as sort of ‘free-riders’ that mainly have an eye on the 
potentials for grabbing power. Nationalist discourses are considered to be an 	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ideological trap that Fanon sees the intellectual elite falling into, when mobilising 
colonial descendants. In his conception, the falsity, besides the excluding elements of 
nationalism as such, are the undesirable relations of exploitation between the 
nationalist leadership and the colonising powers, as well as between the national 
leadership and the people of the liberation struggle. 115  His writings about 
decolonisation and liberation struggles, and the violent processes of breaking the 
bounds of colonialism, which he considers to be deeply internalised in colonial 
subjects, are an interesting parable to the violent turn of the Syrian uprising. A 
violence that according to Fanon is an unavoidable part of the anti-colonial struggle, 
but that should never be idealised, since the effects of violence always have far 
reaching consequences.  
Nationalisms and other ideologies, linked to “identity”-related framings of 
mobilisation, can be further theoretically explored by the Foucauldian investigations 
of the relations between knowledge and power. Foucault said “there is no power 
relation without correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge 
that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time, power relations”.116 In this 
sense the framing processes supposedly engage in the power struggles of 
ideologically determining the struggle. 
5.4.2 Linking Colonialism and Minority Formations 
Benjamin T. White argues that the notion of minorities in Syria is bound to the state 
formation that took place during the Mandate period, and identity formation, 
connected to the idea of minorities, is a social phenomenon.117 Thereby, White 
presents the counter-argument to the continuous proclamations of the inevitable 
sectarian sentiments in Syria.  
Within the borders established by the international society, the numeric division of 
communities suddenly became important, and inside this process culturally-defined 
groups are constructed as legitimate political formations. The construction of minority 
identities was even further fortified by the French favouritism and divisional politics 
that had top-down effects on the structuring of the Syrian communities in formations 
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of minorities and majority.118 
Evidently the politics around separatist demands reflect requests for plurality, but 
paradoxically also draw lines of monolithic developments of organisations built on 
ethno-homogenous communities, a paradox White discusses in relation to 
nationalisms. White considers nationalist separatism to threaten the very foundation 
of the nation-state construction, and on the contrary state-nationalisms to exclude the 
rights claim that is bounded in Kurdish-nationalism(s).119 
5.5 Theoretical Eclecticism in Search of the Third Space 
Sara Ahmed states that “post-coloniality allows us to investigate how colonial 
encounters are both determining and yet not fully determining, of social and material 
existence”.120 Her sentence eloquently makes space for focusing on essentialising 
structures such as colonialism and authoritarianism, but also agency and counter-
mechanisms to power. It reflects the need of engaging with, what Homi Bhabha calls 
the third space, 121  which considers any discursive considerations elements of 
temporality, spatiality and textuality. In this sense, Sara Ahmed and Homi Bhabha 
anticipate tendencies within post-colonial writings, which have been criticised by 
writers such as Aijaz Ahmad, for falling into racist discourses by actually depriving 
post-colonial processes of local agency, and impose an undifferentiated culture 
through categorisation.122  
The struggles for minority rights reflect the continuous difficulties of the Kurdish-
speaking community, due to the Syrian state’s persecution on ethnic-cultural 
expressions and the powerful sentiments of Arab Nationalism, but also the delicate 
balance between asking for ethnic-cultural group rights, without determine the 
members rights to a continuous plurality of identity framed expressions.  
Through a reflective theoretical approach, the synthetic investigation of social and 
political organising and a double research method, this thesis contributes to a third 
space of sciences, which generates ideas in tone with the words of the participants, by 
both challenging essentialisms and by giving space to situated experiences.  
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6 Analysis 
The social movement synthesis is continued as a dividing structure throughout the 
analysis. The purpose of the analysis is to map the recent developments in relation to 
the multiple analyses of the participants. I confront and challenge ideas of 
essentialising narratives and the hegemony of who is in the position of narrating 
current developments. While the main focus lies on the current developments of 
social and political organising in the PYD-controlled areas, trajectories are drawn to 
historical processes of racialisation and suppression as well as counter-movements of 
political dissent since the late Ottoman era. This chapter draws a socio-political 
context-mapping on the new structures unfolding in the PYD-controlled areas and 
includes the arguments of the participants in order to explore the connection between 
bottom-up structures of organising, top-down approaches and the negotiations of 
Kurdishness. 
6.1 An Uprising of Political Differences 
On January 26, 2011, Hasan Ali Akley self-immolated in al-Hasaka, an area mainly 
inhabited by the Kurdish-speaking community, and thereby initiated the first step of 
signs of dissent in Syria.123 His singlehanded protest was followed by months of non-
violent demonstrations in different parts of Syria, which marked the beginning of a 
new era in Syrian history. The Syrian regime answered to the demands of the 
protesters with the same double-edged strategy it had practiced for years: violence 
and manipulative discourses. For reconciling purposes, the regime repealed the 
emergency law of 1963, though simultaneously, obscure and suppressive regulations 
were maintained. They attacked protesters with massive arrest, torture and shootings, 
that later transformed into bombings and massacres. The regime thwarted the uprising 
by blaming it on the Islamists, the criminals and the foreigners,124 while they 
specifically released some of the political Islamist from imprisonment125 and then 
accused the uprising of having a sectarian outset.  
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As a self-fulfilling prophecy, the methods of the regime appeared sectarian, noticeable 
in the ways it acted differently towards the various communities in Syria. Which also 
counts for the shapes of the power structures of the political and military elites, which 
during the recent uprising have secured that there have been no mass defections.126 
The regime’s claim of being the protector of Syria’s minorities seemed to reinforce an 
image of a joint contra-revolutionary position of the different minorities in Syria; an 
image the regime nurtured by showing willingness to reconcile with the Kurdish-
speaking community. This strategy was spelled out by granting citizenship to 250.000 
stateless persons, and by making Nawrooz127 a state-national holiday.128  
 
Many Kurdish-speaking activists have joined and organised demonstrations, along 
with activists representing all of Syria’s communities. The participation of members 
from the Kurdish-speaking community, were however on a broad scale also neglected 
by the leading regime opposition,129 who have seemed fixated on the lack of support 
from the Kurdish nationalist parties. Thereby, the relations within the general regime 
opposition are marked by antagonisms between the different opposition blocks, 
mainly based in different top-down nationalist priorities.  
Prior to the uprising, the Kurdish political parties had negotiated with the regime 
opposition about different initiatives, most notably in the framework of the Damascus 
Declaration.130 In this declaration, the first steps were taken to formulate a joint 
alternative to the regime. Already by then, the various differentialist demands of 
Kurdish and Arab nationalism seemed to become an obstruction for the unification 
process. Which have repeated itself from the early Syrian uprising, by the dominating 
composition of the regime opposition, which was most strongly influenced by the 
Muslim Brotherhood and Arab nationalists, which has caused the continuing 
unwillingness to incorporate constitutional rights for the Kurdish-speaking 
community, as well as for removing the ethnic connotation of “the Arab Republic of 
Syria”, which made leading Kurdish representatives hesitate to immediately join 
forces with the general opposition.131  	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The Kurdish political parties in the PYD-controlled areas have maintained an overall 
hesitant position towards the Syrian uprising. This seems bound in both the fear of the 
repercussion from the Syrian regime, as well as in their complicated relations with the 
regime opposition. Instead of joining the Syrian National Council (SNC), 132  a 
coalition of Kurdish parties, youth organisations and independent activists in October 
2011 formed the Kurdish National Council (KNC). The KNC was meant to be a 
representative organ of a unified Kurdish voice, breaking with former division within 
the party movement.133 However, the establishment of the People’s Council of 
Western Kurdistan (PCWK) on December 16, 2011, a coalition including five 
organisations all connected to the PYD,134 somehow obstructed the unifying project. 
Due to the PYD being the only Kurdish party with a significant armed group under its 
control, it quickly manifested itself as the most influential party. Since the Syrian 
regime withdrew from the now PYD-controlled areas in July 2012, 135  new 
autonomous structures are being constructed, and a third way is outlined,136 which 
follows neither the regime nor the regime opposition. 
6.1.1 The Current Situation in the PYD-controlled Areas 
The Kurdish political movement in Syria has a history of party divisions,137 but while 
the regime withdrew from the now PYD-controlled areas, the KNC and PCWK 
signed the Hewlêr138 declaration.139 The agreement, facilitated by Masoud Barzani, 
leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the president of the Kurdistan 
Regional Government (KRG), had as its main purpose to prevent internal Syrian-
Kurdish fighting. The agreement founded the Supreme Kurdish Committee (SKC), a 
structural organ with the purpose of democratising the power division in the area, 
respectively granting the KNC five seats and the PCWK five seats.  
In November 2012 there were follow-up talks between the KNC and the PCWK in 
Hewlêr, and a joint press release led to analytical anticipations of the dissolution of 	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the Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (YPG),140 a surmise that was conjured away the same 
day by a YPG release, stating that the unit was not to join any other forces and that it 
would only answer to the people.141 The YPG statement conflicted with the supposed 
function of the SKC as the ruling organ of a united force. But, in 2013 the political 
strategies seemed to change, since the PYD started to describe the YPG as the armed 
force of the SKC, but in this way again eliminated the possibilities of the allowance of 
Peshmerga142 forces to enter the areas.143 
On September 2013, a nine-point plan to build a joint administration was signed by 
the KNC and the PCWK,144 but the ambitious plan of a shared political project 
already crumbled two months later when the PYD only with the support of two small 
left wing parties, formed a transitional administration. 145  In late December, 
negotiations between the KNC and PCWK were resumed,146 but without results. In 
January 2014, while the Geneva II negotiations147 fell a part, the three cantons of 
Afrin, Cizîre148 and Kobanê composing the areas controlled by the PYD, declared 
autonomy. 
6.1.2 Democratic Autonomy  
The developments in the PYD-controlled areas are discursively evolved around the 
democratic potential of the Democratic Autonomy.149 The most powerful structures, 
such as the tribunal courts, the Asayish, the YPG, and even the canton governments; 	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seem to be mainly under PYD control.150 The meaning and content of democracy are 
thereby a developing paradox, which is tried out in the negotiating attempts between 
the different political parties, the political structures that are established, and the 
possible influence of the grassroots organising in the area. In other words a 
democratic paradox that develops through the possible balance between bottom-up 
organising and top-down implementations, between framings and practices, and in the 
actual division within the various parts of the PYD. 
It is early to evaluate the current political stage of the Democratic Autonomy in the 
PYD-controlled areas, thus I will attempt to give a temporal situation picture. 
Compared to the situation in all other parts of the liberated areas,151 violence in the 
PYD-controlled areas has been remarkably little.152 This is mainly due to the fact that 
the regime airplanes do not bomb the PYD-controlled areas, and because there is no 
internal fights between various militant groups. Since the YPG and the Asayish 
strictly uphold the monopoly of violence in the area, which is a result of the Hewlêr 
agreement mentioned above.  
6.1.2.1 Top-Down Implementations of Democratic Autonomy 
The project of the Democratic Autonomy is in continuous development, and only very 
recently have state-similar structures, such as police, courts and canton governments, 
been established. Considering the monopoly on violence, the theoretical suggestions 
of Charles Tilly153 clarify the systemic problems of no clear differentiation between 
the militant parts of the PYD, and its political parts, which in this sense creates the 
foundation of authoritarian structures and mechanisms.  
 
Following the outline on the political developments in the PYD-controlled areas 
above, the PYD appear to negotiate politically, but on ground keeping a tight hold on 
power. International, as well as Kurdish, sources have on several occasions accused 
the PYD of using physical and structural abuse, e.g. misuse of the YPG, to suppress 
political opponents. Thus the latest report by Human Rights Watch documents several 
incidences of rights violations, such as arbitrary arrest of PYD ‘political rivals’.154 
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The ‘Charter of the Social Contract’,155 announced by the PYD in January 2014, 
Human Rights Watch considers upholding ‘some important human rights standards 
but neglects to stipulate a number of core principles’.156 The conflicting positions 
around interpretations of political misuse are also exemplified in the latest political 
quarrel between the KNC and the canton administration, regarding a law requiring all 
political parties to be licensed by the administrations. The initiative was interpreted by 
the KNC as yet another method of the PYD to control its political opponents.157 
 
If the newly and continuously developing structures of the Democratic Autonomy 
contain flaws, it is no wonder. With the violence and recent changes in Syria, the 
situation in the PYD-controlled areas is developing fast, and is in its very beginning. 
Still, the lack of compromise by the PYD and their tied grip on the power positions 
might seem counter-productive, or at least a very intransigent position that opposes 
the noble ambitions of the constitution and the very democratic potential in the newly 
established political structures. 
6.1.2.2 Bottom-Up organising of the Democratic Autonomy 
The top-down structures of the PYD are developed concurrently with more popular 
driven and anarchist-inspired structures that are generated through Tev-Dem,158 and a 
commune system.159 According to Charles Tilly, the formations of civil resistance, 
which I in this thesis consider to be implemented through bottom-up organising, are 
decisive in order to secure citizens’ rights.160 The PYD version of the Democratic 
Autonomy is inspired by the notion of what Abdullah Öcalan calls Democratic 
Autonomy also termed ‘Democratic Confederalism’, 161  which in its bottom-up 
approach differs from the federal developments in Iraqi Kurdistan, due to Öcalan’s 
inspiration of the anarchist writer, Murray Boockkin. The Democratic Autonomy 
includes an implicit criticism of state and capitalist structures, and through bottom-up 
organising, the project is meant to constitute a practice of radical democracy, where 
arguably the women’s active engagement in the political structures are one of the 
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most remarkable accomplishments.162 Similar to the unclear division between the 
different state-similar structures and the PYD, it is unclear, how the bottom-up 
organising of the Tev-Dem functions independently from the PYD party, as well as 
how influential organising of the communes are. According to Mamosta Abdulselam, 
from Tev-Dem in Hasake, who is quoted in a Tatort-report,163 the commune system 
was implemented in order to close the gap between the canton governments and the 
people, but since it is not inscribed in the Social Charter it is unclear how it is 
structurally implemented in practice.  
6.1.3 Benefitting from the Changes in the PYD-controlled Areas 
In the light of political opportunities of suppression or facilitation, the positions of the 
four different actors sketched above: the Syrian regime, the regime opposition, the 
Kurdish parties and the grassroots movements, are decisive.  
The Kurdish question has historically been tackled differently by the Syrian regime in 
different times, depending on what benefitted it the most. In the 1980s and 1990s, the 
PKK, the KDP and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) were used in the regime’s 
policies against the Turkish and the Iraqi governments respectively. The Qamişlo 
uprising was used by the regime mainly to gain support from the Sunni Arab 
population in Syria.164 At the beginning of the Syrian uprising, the regime changed its 
policy once again as outlined above, and attempted to launch negotiations with the 
Kurdish political parties and granted citizenship to stateless Kurds. The regime thus 
took the position of being the protector of the minorities. The Kurdish culture, once a 
threat to the Syrian state, is suddenly portrayed as something that should be protected 
and defended from being dissolved by a radical Sunni majority.165 In this sense, the 
developments of the Democratic Autonomy seem to fit the discourses of the regime, 
and the regime has even through its political openings influenced the direction of the 
current developments. 
 
The Syrian uprising in its beginning seemed to sweep over the head of most of the 
Kurdish parties. Though the Kurdish parties position, as representatives of the 
Kurdish-speaking community have been regained, since the regime withdrew from 	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the PYD-controlled areas in 2012. While the regime withdrawal from the now PYD-
controlled areas also could have benefitted the general regime opposition, the 
continuous reluctance of the regime opposition to recognise group rights of the 
Kurdish-speaking community, have arguably only strengthened the position of the 
Kurdish parties even further.  
As elaborated above, the developments in the PYD-controlled areas seem to move in 
two different directions within the Democratic Autonomy. One direction is set by the 
newly built structures, which secure the power of the Kurdish party movement 
through organs such as the canton governments, the Asayish and the SKC. Until now, 
the power seems to lie solely in the hands of the PYD, arguably due to their monopoly 
on the violence in the areas that they control, and especially due to no clear distinction 
between the militant and political part of the party. The other direction is the 
developments of the civil organisation of Tev-Dem and the people’s communes, 
which due to the democratic potential has caught the attention of different 
international actors such as anarchist activists,166 scholars,167 and even mainstream 
media.168 
6.2 Mobilising structures 
Through the accounts of the research participants in this part of the analysis I explore 
different types of mobilisation structures that are currently developing in the PYD-
controlled areas. Top-down methods of organising are compared with more bottom-
up approaches of less structured networks, and the different movements are related to 
their access to resources and thereby their capabilities to uphold a sustainable 
continuity. The challenges of organising within an authoritarian setting of the regime 
are compared to the challenges of organising under the PYD control.  
In the methodological chapter, a differentiation of the research participants from Nap 
was introduced, between the PYD members, the KNC members and the 
revolutionaries. In accordance to the socio-political analysis above the forms of top-
down political organising and social and political bottom-up organising interacts in 
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fluid patterns. The distinctions and overlaps between the different positions will be 
considered and the possibilities of brokerage and diffusion as well as the effects of co-
optation and polarisation are mechanisms that will be taken into consideration.  
6.2.1 The Party Movement in the Light of Contentious Politics 
The Kurdish parties have arguably contributed to the ‘collective vehicles’, which 
clarifies systemic features and breaks with the interpretation of suppression as an 
isolated experience.169 The historical component of the parties as being elitist projects 
to generate influence for its leadership, has until now not been altered, since the old 
power structures within the parties remains intact.170 Developments, which resonate 
with the point by Harriet Allsopp, that most party leaders gain their support from their 
family, tribe or region. The unalterable hierarchies within the parties have been a 
contributing factor to the many splits in the Syrian-Kurdish parties through time.171 
 
The authoritarian system in Syria, as already concluded in the literature review, has 
nurtured a difficult environment for social and political organising to develop. The 
authoritarian character of the regime had the power strictly centred, with almost no 
openings for non-regime public performances, which relates to the obvious obstacles 
of creating any diffusion, brokerage or cross-political alliances.  
While the brokerage role of the Kurdish parties with the regime might have been 
effective in preventing the regime from releasing its violence against the community, 
it has clearly worked against the processes of diffusion. This was arguably seen 
during the Qamişlo uprising,172 and in the PKK’s utterances, when Abdullah Öcalan 
still was hosted by the Syrian regime, falling into the regime rhetoric of the Syrian 
Kurdish-speaking community all being migrants from the Turkish-Kurdish areas.173 
In this sense the parties conducted a form of co-optation rather than brokerage. Which 
have generally made the Kurdish-speaking community lose trust in the Kurdish 
politicians through different periods of time. 
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6.2.1.1 Power-holding ‘Free-Riders’ 
The Syrian uprising created new opportunities for the Kurdish party movement to 
build functional political structures, and not only act as representatives negotiating the 
space of Kurdish cultural expressions.174 The regional aspects of the developments 
have been concurrently confirmed, the Hewlêr agreement, as mentioned above, points 
to the regional connectedness between Iraqi Kurdistan and the PYD-controlled areas. 
Though the agreement has prevented armed internal-fighting, the power division in 
the SKC seems to be a source of continuous conflict, and thereby a downside to the 
agreement.  
 
A diffusion of the PYD seems currently to take place in the areas they control, which 
relate to their brokerage capabilities, both when negotiating with the regime, as well 
as when manoeuvring in negotiations with the other Kurdish parties of the KNC. The 
institutionalisation of the PYD structures arguably hinders the possibilities of 
considering the PYD an actual social movement, but rather a political actor since its 
structures gets co-opted with something similar to a new governing-apparatus.175  
Even though the fighters of the YPG as well as the police officers of the Asayish are 
members of the Syrian Kurdish-speaking community, most of them have been 
educated by and have been serving the PKK in Turkey and the Qandil region, Iraq.176 
Zaid from the TCK raises his worries about the PYD even bringing PKK members 
from Urfa or Gaziantep to govern in Nap.177  
Since the uprising started, the PYD has taking advantage of PKK resources and has 
benefitted from the militant training, equipment and interconnected structures 
between the PYD and the PKK.178 Since January 2014 they have even implemented 
the Democratic Autonomy in accordance to the PKK ideology. 
 
The KRG on the other hand has trained Syrian Kurdish military defectors in Iraq and 
in October 2012 they numbered around 1200 people under arms.179 The history of 
Iraqi Kurdistan includes years of internal fighting between the KDP and PUK.  
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Zaza from the KDPS argues that these experiences are extremely valuable to keep a 
strong argument to by all means prevent internal armed fighting in the PYD-
controlled areas. It has taught his party in Syria to lay low, and only criticise misdeeds 
by the PYD with words, even in cases where the PYD has killed or kidnapped 
members of the KDPS. 180  
 
When asked how the PYD ensures that they have the support from the people, Daf 
from the Asayish argues that the PYD and the PKK have experiences that goes 25 
years back, and the civil society organisation, Tev-Dem, is one of the contributing 
structures that stem from this experience.181  
The members of the Comrades, presents the counter-argument by stating that the 
Democratic Autonomy system seems to favour only PYD members, which in their 
argumentations make these very bottom-up structures of the Tev-Dem as an example 
not representative or democratic at all.182 According to the Comrades, the different 
regulations of the Democratic Autonomy functions as forms of control mechanisms. 
While in the opinion of Daf from the Asayish, the bureaucratisation is a guarantee of 
equality. In Daf’s submission the PYD has built a system of laws that grants equal 
political rights for all, and because everything is systemised, any organisation that 
wants to make a public appearance has to apply for permission. Only when it comes 
to the militancy there are limits. The YPG needs to be the only armed organisation in 
the area, but every person who wants to join can do so. The reason why the YPG has 
to be the only militant organisation is to prevent internal fighting.183 
Since the PYD took over control, they have collected taxes in an increasingly 
organised way, according to the Social Contract Article 19: “There is no tax and no 
draw without a legal text.”184 But according to the research participants, who are not 
PYD-members, the PYD collects taxes in an informal way.185 Which is considered 
both irregular and abusive. Members of the Comrades even give examples of PYD 
members threatening and arresting people if they do not pay.186  
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Except for the few parties of the KNC that supported the Syrian uprising, the PYD 
and the KNC have from a contentious politics perspective, encouraged a de-
mobilisation of the Kurdish-speaking community’s involvement in the Syrian 
uprising. The Kurdish parties have advised the Kurdish-speaking community to 
exhibit precaution towards participating in demonstrations, supporting the uprising or 
any militant organisations besides the YPG.187 More accurately, the PYD militants 
even from the early uprising have attempted to violently prevent demonstrators of the 
Kurdish-speaking community from joining the anti-regime demonstrations.188  
Thereby, the “old” party structures in the PYD-controlled areas could be considered 
‘free riders’, as suggested by Asef Bayat,189 since they have contributed little to the 
actual uprising that shook the Syrian regime, and the parties have an ideological 
structure that mainly conflicts with the bottom-up approach of the early uprising. 
However, instead the PYD has encouraged mobilisation around the project of the 
Democratic Autonomy.  
 
The KDPS is also a member of the KNC, and is the party in the PYD-controlled areas 
with the strongest oppositional position to the PYD. Members of the KDPS have on 
several occasions been imprisoned by the PYD, including the research participants 
Zaza and Daw, which they consider political persecution.190  
In December 2012, the KDPS made a division in the KNC, when forming a new 
political coalition, called the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union (SKDU)191 with three 
other parties, which is a coalition more strongly engaged with the regime opposition 
in Turkey. The KDPS party has from the beginning supported the uprising, and the 
leader of the party, Abdul Hakim Bashar, is the vice president of the Syrian National 
Coalition.192  
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The affiliation between the KDPS and the KDP in Iraq grants the KDPS mobilisation 
resources, but also points to foreign dependency and another sort of external support, 
which is critically discussed by amongst others, Abu Ras from the Yekiti party.193  
6.2.2 Revolutionaries in Difficult Times 
The amount of violence of the Syrian uprising and the foreign interference led the 
supporters of the Syrian uprising on several occasions to state that international actors 
have stolen their uprising, and that this influence disturbs the focus on the toppling of 
the regime.194 Their statements reflect the substantial turn the Syrian uprising has 
taken from consisting of bottom-up public protesting to becoming dominated by 
militant brigades. The lack of a strong snowball effect of army defections, arguably 
due to the sectarian crony-capitalist composition of the regime,195 has instead caused 
the struggle to take a violent turn. 
The metamorphisms of the struggle have arguably sidelined or demobilised the non-
violent participants of the uprising. And concretely, the organisational takeover by the 
‘free riders’ in the PYD-controlled areas, constitute another challenge for the 
possibilities of supporting the Syrian uprising, and the revolutionaries’ possibilities of 
generating resources around their continuous participation in the struggle. The extra-
ordinary event of public expressions of dissent is at the moment difficult to uphold. 
What is not mentioned by the participants, but is yet another important factor of the 
demobilisation of the civil organising of the uprising, is the co-optation of the 
uprising activists into international NGOs, which have caused a continuous brain 
drain from the uprising in Syria.196 
6.2.2.1 The TCK and the Comrades 
Zaid belong to the revolutionary participants, and he is a member of the TCK, while 
Im Nub, Abu Nub and Ras are all members of the Comrades. The origins of the TCK 
date back to 2005, when it was founded as a response to the Qamişlo uprising,197 but 
arguably first during the current uprising the group has mobilised substantially. The 
TCK have grown to become a noticeable civil organising movement in the PYD-
controlled areas, with members representing a broad spectrum of the political scene 	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from the Syrian Coalition to the KNC and the PCWK.198 Even though Ras from the 
Comrades criticises TCK’s indirect support to the PYD’s authority, since the 
movement applies for permission when conducting demonstrations.199 The TCK has 
already opposed any significant support to the PYD, by publicly criticising the party’s 
suppression of oppositional voices in the areas they control.200 In this sense, the TCK 
belong to the new revolutionary sentiments in Syria, since it is a movement that 
supports a struggle for the rights of the Kurdish-speaking community along with all 
other communities in Syria, a joint struggle that Zaid considers a tactical target that 
the regime seeks to destroy.201  
The TCK until now seems to have been able to uphold a form of political significance 
in the PYD-controlled areas, by staying diffused and by conducting brokerage 
through having members in the different political spectrums. 
 
The Comrades on the other hand, is a group founded during the uprising and they 
have suffered hard from the violent turn of the events, which have caused 
displacement and detached group-members from each other. The Comrades has 
members from both the Kurdish-speaking community as well as from the Arabic-
speaking communities. The point of departure of the group’s work was areas in the 
city of Oas202 with a high heterogeneity in the population. There the group took an 
active part in the Syrian uprising, both by organising demonstrations, by coordinating 
relief, by housing internally displaced people and by designing creative campaigns 
pro-unity and against the regime. While the Comrades have had seats in the local 
council of Oas, the group withdrew from that political engagement, since the council, 
in relation to decisions of the Coalition, cut down on seats for members of the 
Kurdish-speaking community, a decision that the Comrades wanted to protest 
against.203  
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In the PYD-controlled areas on the other hand, the members of the Comrades have 
had limited possibilities of organising as they fear repercussions from the PYD, since 
every demonstration that was organised against the Syrian regime has been stopped 
by the PYD.204 Due to the PYD’s techniques of suppression towards what it considers 
as significant opposition, members of the Comrades have kept a low profile. 
In this sense, the group seems to currently face a de-mobilising process along with 
other revolutionary activists of the Syrian uprising. As the methods of the Comrades 
contained elements of brokerage, due to its activities in the local council of Oas and 
by generally being a group organising across different communities in Syria, these de-
essentailising bottom-up ideas are right now significantly obstructed. 
6.2.3 An International Society of Changing Colours 
Throughout the conversations, the interests and influence of the regional and 
international actors is taken into considerations. The Comrades and the KDPS 
members agree that the Syrian uprising has gone from being the peoples’ revolution 
to becoming a playing field for international powers.205 Especially the unwillingness 
of the international community to react to the violent actions of the regime is 
criticised: 
Im Nub: There was a chemical attack and what did they do? The red line, what 
did it do? It changed colour. 
Abu Nub: Obama said that tomorrow we will fire, but tomorrow came and the 
day after and nothing happened. 
Im Nub: Of course if they intervened, it would also be a tragedy, the war 
would grow. […] But our children have a future and now what? When will 
this war end? We should stay like this and count the days, one after the other? 
This day the Free Syrian Army (FSA) won and the next day the regime, this is 
not a solution.206  
 
The revolutionaries continue their arguments by stating that the failure of the 
international society to support the non-radical elements of the uprising, has left these 
resources in despair, or with no other possibilities than joining more radical elements 
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of the uprising. After three years of struggle ’the people got tired’, as it is expressed 
by Ras from the Comrades.207 
 
The discussions above show the paradox between the downsides of international 
interferences and the reliance and hope on the international society to fulfil their 
obligations in relation to international conventions. In relation to the war on Islamic 
State (IS), recent developments are arguably displaying an international society of 
changing colours yet again. While the different militant fractions in the liberated areas 
have fought IS, most remarkably in January 2014 when a joint alliance between YPG, 
the FSA and the Islamic Front, almost expelled IS from Syria,208 the international 
society seemed to suddenly wake up when IS invaded Mosul in June 2014. The 
change of colours led the USA to provide weapons to the YPG defending Kobanê 
against IS,209 which potentially could be a game changer for the PYD in terms of 
achieving international recognition for the Democratic Autonomy. The bombing of IS 
and Jabhat al-Nusrah will possibly also support the position of the regime, since they 
constitute part of the militant resistance against the regime. 
6.2.4 Political and Social organising in the PYD-controlled Areas 
Generally, the party movement has contributed to clarify the collective suppression of 
the Kurdish-speaking community, but also contributed to maintaining its 
demobilisation. This tendency has repeated itself during the Syrian uprising, where 
the PYD instead mobilised for the project of the Democratic Autonomy.  
Depending on the access to resources, the parties have had different strategies. The 
PYD with monopoly on violence and with the support from the PKK have taken 
control over the areas, the Yekiti party with limited resources have kept a neutral 
position and benefitted from supporting the PYD. While the KDPS, though having the 
support of the KDP in Iraq and being a part of the Coalition, seemed not able to take 
advantage of these resources, but rather chose to lay low. 
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The supporters of the uprising, in the case of the Comrades and the TCK depending 
on their position towards the PYD, have developed differently. The TCK, who are 
organising within the Kurdish-speaking community and who have members across 
the political spectra, have managed to uphold a significant position. The Comrades, 
who is not willing to cooperate with the PYD, and despite being a group spread across 
the boundaries of different communities, is currently facing difficulties or complete 
de-mobilisation. 
6.3 Framing Processes 
In this third part of the analysis, I seek to collect the threads of the two previous parts, 
while exploring the framings of organising of the Kurdish-speaking community in 
Syria. Ethnic framing as a strategic mobilising tool is compared to alternative framing 
discourses, which is considered a developing field of tension. How expressions of 
Kurdishness develop around ethnicity is discussed in relation to the Democratic 
Autonomy project, the ideology of the different parties of the KNC and the 
revolutionaries. The divisional points of the participants are outlined, but also 
challenged by the participants’ comparable criticisms of the current developments, 
and the ideas of conducting a “thought revolution”. Importantly, the differences 
between framed discourses and political practices are discussed in relation to 
observations and reflections of the participants.  
6.3.1 Ethnic framing 
The Kurdish nationalist movement in Syria has, since the Baath party took over 
power, operated from a point of an illegalised position and worked against the 
criminalising state-measures against Kurdish national and ethnic identity. Since the 
failure of the Ararat revolt, organised by the Xoybûn,210 Kurdish nationalists from 
Syria have been part of trans-border struggles for Kurdish rights within and outside of 
Syrian borders.211 
In 1947, Albert Hourani writes in his book “Minorities in the Arab World” that 
Kurdish is not a unified language and Kurds can barely be considered a nation, though 	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various dynasties have arisen in the area of Kurdistan.212 His six descriptive lines on 
the Kurdish-speaking community, as well as the title of the book, imply ideas of many 
different communities of multi-linguistic origin, who should not only be considered to 
live in an Arab world, but also should it be questioned whether or not they can be 
considered communities at all. His Arab nationalist account together with e.g. the 
Arab nationalist position of the current regime opposition reflects a conformity and a 
discursive framing that is deeply rooted in colonialist discourses and perceptions. A 
sort of power generating process of mapping and freezing cultures and ethno-
linguistic groupings, which in the light of Michel Foucault’s works on knowledge and 
power,213 evidently lay the ground for counter-Kurdish discourses, and encourage a 
Kurdish nationalist tool-kit of contention. 
 
The point is, that how deeply rooted or imagined a Kurdish national community might 
be, it is irrelevant compared to the realness of such sentiments of a given community. 
Abbas Vali elaborates how the struggles for national rights have a strong democratic 
potential for any given society.214 But as Frantz Fanon points out, that potential has 
often been exploited by the nationalist bourgeoisie’s obsessions with gaining power. 
In the environments of exclusive discourses and violent suppression methods, the 
risks of a racialised ethnic backfire are heightened.  
6.3.1.1 Nationalist Obstructions 
Arguably, the Syrian regime has encouraged a particular regional outlook of the 
Syrian Kurdish-speaking community by in certain times allowing the PKK, the KDP 
and the PUK to operate freely in Syria. A tactic used to ventilate the Kurdish 
nationalist sentiments towards the struggle for a Kurdistan in Iraq and Turkey and 
diminish the struggle in Syria.215 
From the time of the Ottoman Empire, during the French Mandate and even during 
the Baath rule in Syria, the Syrian Kurdish-speaking community has withheld a strong 
connection to the Kurdish-speaking communities living in the surrounding countries. 	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The relationships have taken the shape of everything from family ties, business 
relations to political alliances. Paradoxically, the Syrian borders might thereby have 
had less importance for the orientation of the population living close to them in the 
Northern Syrian areas, which relates to the fact that the ‘link between population, 
state and territory is a human construction’,216 and the authority of the state would be 
less present to manifest it in the more remote areas, which correlates with the 
arguments of Heydemann and Leenders on why Dera’a consisted a good environment 
for protests.217 
 
Since the Baath regime took over power, the Kurdish party movement has been the 
strongest representative of the Kurdish-speaking community and they have negotiated 
the fluctuating space of illegality of Kurdish cultural and political activities. A 
distinction the Syrian regime has contributed to distort, since it has equally targeted 
expressions of both.218 The double exclusion from the public spheres, both culturally 
and politically, has made the party movement focus on Kurdish cultural expressions, a 
tendency that has contributed to the popularity of a Kurdish nationalist discourse, 
politicised Kurdish culture, and added to the racialising processes of Kurdish ethnic-
nationalist politics. 
 
After the beginning of the Syrian uprising, the Kurdish parties have generally seemed 
ready to play the role of being in a somewhat neutral position by choosing a third way 
that neither supports the regime nor the opposition.219 The somewhat neutral position 
is arguably based in three interrelated issues: First, the near memory of the violent 
response by the Syrian regime during the Qamişlo uprising in 2004,220 have made the 
parties fear that the regime could take a manipulative turn against the Kurdish-
speaking community, if they joined the uprising too fast. This is paradoxically 
combined with a vague interest in the renewed political opening of reconciliation with 
the regime.  
Second, the leading elements of the regime opposition seem bound in Arab 
nationalism, by not wanting to recognise Kurds as an independent group with group 
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rights. The repetitive story of a divisional opposition last confirmed in the failed 
framework of the Damascus Declaration, withholds.  
The third issue of the Kurdish party movement is regarding Turkey’s possible 
influence on the “Arab” opposition, since Turkey hosts most of the regime opposition. 
And Turkey, in the Kurdish party movement’s eyes, is no role model in terms of how 
to handle the Kurdish question, with a century long history of suppression of the 
Turkish Kurdish-speaking community.221 
 
In the exposition above, the basic paradox of top-down ethno-nationalist concerns 
within state-structures is uncovered as a sort of racialising nationalist Kurdish 
exceptionalism that interacts with excluding mechanisms of Arab nationalism and 
Turkish nationalism.  
These historical bound experiences of excluding processes of the Kurdish-speaking 
community is stressed in the discussions among the revolutionary participants, when 
they reason why they went to the streets in the first place. Their arguments are 
examples of a position that challenges both differentialisms and nationalist 
exclusions, when the Comrades expresses how they demonstrated to express and 
include differences in public space, with the goal to fight for common rights and unity 
in Syria. Im Nub explains that they went to the Syrian streets to have rights like 
human beings,222 but Abu Nub follows up by noting that the Syrian uprising evolved 
in the totally different direction, since each community is now turning in on itself.223 
6.3.2 A Birth giving Revolution 
The violent confrontation with the regime opposition against the PYD-controlled 
areas is used by the PYD as the paramount argument against controlling political 
dissent, since rhetorically opposition to the PYD is connected to the interests of 
Turkey.224  
The members of the Comrades struggle to accept what they consider suppressive 
policies. While Daf from the Asayish agrees with the idea that suppression from a 
Kurdish party is much harder to accept, than the suppression from the Baath regime, 
though in his opinion, the dividing line is whether the objective is the authority or not. 
He says: “You see the chair over there, that chair is for who? For the leader here, but 	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the leader does not sit there, they don’t like that chair”.225 Implicitly he is arguing that 
the PYD has not taken the authority. According to him, the goal of the PYD is not to 
reach the authority in society, but to create what he calls a ‘thought revolution’.226 
 
The current outlook of the uprising and the developments in the PYD-controlled areas 
are jointly criticised by the Comrades: 
Im Nub: Our revolution looks like a woman that is giving birth […] it is 
painful, pain, pain, pain. Our revolution is only pain and until now there has 
been no birth giving relief.227 
 
Ethno-nationalist discourses within the Syrian uprising have experienced much 
progress, supported by heavy racialised violence and demographic processes where 
the Syrian population is seen to enclave within communities of common origin. Abu 
Nub expresses these negative processes:  
[M]y son Val as an example, he did not know that he was Sunni. Val did not 
know and Nub did not know, what is the Sunni? It is Muslim, but my God, 
Sunni, Alawi and Shia we did not have these divisions before228 
 
The Syrian uprising was stolen by radical elements that Abu Nub sees as active on the 
side of the regime, as well as on the side of the ‘risers’.  
 
The revolutionaries,229 Abu Ras from the Yekiti party230 and Daf from the Asayish231 
all suggest the need for a second revolution in Syria. They all agree to the need for a 
revolution that is educative and teaches the people the meaning of freedom as well as 
the limits to it, in the sense of the importance of respecting the other. In the words of 
the participants, the revolution in Syria is thereby considered to have two purposes, 
first of all, to overthrow the regime, and second of all to overcome the internalised 
authoritarian teachings within the people. If this does not take place simultaneously, 
the new president in Syria will have, in the words of Daf: “the same ideas and culture, 	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it will be the culture of the current regime, where this one is called Bashar, and the 
next will be called Ali.”232 According to Daf, a thought revolution is necessary to 
liberate the people from the internalised politics of the Baath, since the freed minds 
would never accept suppression.233 
6.3.3 The Ideology of the PYD 
Though the Democratic Autonomy project is framed as an inclusive cross-cultural 
project,234 political structures and social organising are arguably manifested around 
certain ideas of identity. According to Abbas Vali, Kurdish nationalism has been 
shaped around the cultural denial of expressions of Kurdishness and the ideas of 
resistance towards this.235 Kurdish nationalist expression is arguably unfolding in the 
PYD-controlled areas in terms of Kurdish language and Kurdish political dominance. 
Tough according to Article 9 in the Social Contract: “The official languages of Al-
Jazera province is Kurdish, Arabic, Assyrians with ensuring education for children of 
other components in their mother tongue.”236 Unavoidably Kurdish has become the 
dominating language. The PYD on their official homepage criticises nationalism as 
out-dated and claim that their goal rather is to change the traditional thought systems 
and mobilise across ethnic lines and the political field.237  
According to Daf, the Democratic Autonomy of the PYD is built upon the ideology of 
Abdullah Öcalan, but he states that the leadership of Öcalan should not be compared 
to the “regular” Middle Eastern leader, such as Saddam Hussein of Iraq or Atatürk in 
Turkey, because Öcalan is only the leader of thought.238 In Daf’s presentation Tev-
Dem, is the carrying structure of the Democratic Autonomy, and it is this structure 
that grants the practicing of the bottom-up organising in the democratic autonomy.239 
 
Ahmed Akkaya and Joost Jongerden consider Abdullah Öcalan and PKK to have 
gone through a recent ideological change, from a Marxist-Leninist ideology, to 
become an organisation inspired by an anarchist project of radical democracy, which 	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is meant to be a bottom-up practice, in line with the writings of Michael Hardt, 
Antonio Negri and Murray Bookchin. Through the borrowing of Zizek’s term a 
“Jacobian paradox”, Akkaya and Jongerden admit to the paradox of the organisation’s 
use of violence to acquire this form of Democratic Autonomy.240 
According to the first part of the analysis, exactly this same paradox seems to have 
been transferred to the PYD, since there in practice is no clear separation between the 
militant part and the political part of the party. This becomes the Achilles heel of the 
political project of Democratic Autonomy, since the bottom-up democratic structures 
seem only to be relevant for PYD supporters. Signs of political exclusion, in its 
obstruction of everyone’s participatory possibilities, come to mirror a practice of the 
PYD, similar to the regime’s rule that the PYD claim to fight, and thereby form of 
new territorially bound authoritarianism. 
 
According to Ras from the Comrades, the PYD exploit the national sentiments of the 
Kurdish-speaking community, in order to win support around their political project. In 
his words, Kurdistan is a dream that the YPG fighters are willing to die for.241 The 
PYD however uses different nationalist political discourses depending on what 
argument it wants to follow, which obscures the notion of PYD’s political position. 
Ras says: 
There is no clear political project, you talk with some people and they tell you 
that we [the Kurds] have a project together with the Alawies, and then there 
are the people that say that we want to create a great Kurdistan. But how can it 
both be about creating the greater Kurdistan and in the same time you [the 
PYD] work for united Syrian politics?242  
 
As Ras puts it, the PYD apparently both work for a greater Kurdistan, but also for the 
Democratic Autonomy to be an un-divisional part of Syria, which he considers a 
paradox.  
Though, according to the nation-state criticism of Öcalan, this does not necessarily 
contradict. In the PYD and PKK, perspectives these kinds of objections are 
expressions of the very state focused approach, which is an approach they wish to 	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liberate their project from. In Daf’s words, the goal is to liberate the people from the 
limits of borders.243 This resonates with Akkaya and Jongerden’s interpretation of 
PKK ideology. They state, that according to Öcalan, the unification of Kurdistan will 
develop through joint systems of Democratic Confederalism and Democratic 
Autonomy, and in this sense the importance of borders ceases, and democracy 
becomes separated from nationalism.244 
6.3.4 The ideology of the Revolutionaries 
The ideological framing of the Syrians engaging with the uprising arguably fits what 
Sari Hanafi consider a reflexive individualism. 245  Contrary to a neoliberal 
individualism, reflexive individualism is not build on binary thought systems, but 
enters into continuous negotiations between the activist and the surrounding 
structures, which become processes of emancipation, since it involves questioning 
disciplinary formations in society.246 As it has been unfolded by the accounts of the 
revolutionaries in this thesis, the identity shifts integrated in the Syrian uprising was 
meant to work for intersectional rights, but the violent turn has shaped the uprising 
towards manifesting identity boundaries and forming Syrians in relation to their 
community of belonging. 
 
Especially the members of the Comrades express a reflexive individualism. Im Nub as 
an example challenges any generalisations of what Kurdishness, womanhood or 
political engagements means. Her self-reflection projects her own conceptions of 
plural identity framing.  
She is a Sunni Muslim, but rather agnostic. She has been political active during the 
uprising, but is currently disillusioned by the violence of the struggle. She does not 
belong to any tribe, but she belongs to a political engaged family, where her father has 
been a leading member of the KDPS,247 and her brother now is a leading member of 
the TCK. She almost speaks better Arabic than Kurdish, since she was educated in 
Arabic, and she studied English at Oas University. 
Im Nub admits to be a woman, a mother, a daughter, and wife, and especially as a 
wife she had to fight for her rights, against what she considers Middle Eastern 	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traditions that do not expect women to express strong opinions in public.248 Though 
Im Nub is opposing the PYD ruling methods, but she considers it a party that has 
supported the role of women significantly.249 
When she wanted to join the local council in Oas, she did not step down though many 
close related family members warned her from getting into trouble with the PYD,250 
but her political carrier failed due to the Coalition leaving less seats in the council to 
representatives of the Kurdish-speaking community. She now wishes for a second 
revolution in Syria that could correct the misdirected formations of power, and 
educate the Syrian people on freedom and democracy through practice.251 
 
Arguably the sort of reflexiveness, that characterises the expressions of the Comrades, 
is possible since they are not bound by any party political restrictions. Further it is 
pointing to features and emerging ideas, which are a part of the ongoing Syrian 
uprising. This sort of reflexive ideas combined with the loose organising have been 
challenged by violence and the ever altering situation, where especially the reflexive 
revolutionaries have lost activists due to displacements and to their co-optation in e.g. 
NGOs. Despite the more marginalised position in the contemporary struggle in Syria, 
it is important to underline the revolutionaries’ positions and activities. In line with 
Homi Bhabhas third space,252 and with critical voices of writers such as Jacques E. 
Kabbanji,253 I find the many different reflexive expressions of the participants to 
make ground for a break with the epistemological frameworks within an orientalist 
knowledge production, which is built upon fixed paradigms of “Arab”, “Kurd” or 
Middle Eastern exceptionalism that frame the Syrian uprising as primordial sectarian.  
6.3.5 Comparing Framing Strategies 
In order to sum-up the different framings presented, I will illuminate the analysis in 
the light of historical processes, which more clearly stress the differing tendencies. 
The purpose is not to cover all mobilising structures that the Kurdish-speaking 
community in Syria has been a part of, but to pay attention to the diversity of 
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organisation and to look into the framing processes in relation to the political 
opportunities and how mobilising structures have unfolded. 
The mobilising opportunities that were established by the Syrian uprising, due to the 
shaking of the power-holding position of the Syrian regime, and thereby possible 
transformations of borders, demography and the power constructions in Syria, seem in 
some ways to be comparable to the time around the fall of the Ottoman Empire and 
during the French Mandate.  
If comparing the mobilisations taking place in the uprising with the mobilisations 
during the French Mandate there seems to be fundamental differences between 
bottom-up organisation, such as the Muroud254  and the Comrades that broadly 
challenge stagnant power hierarchies and the leading position of both the Syrian 
regime and the Kurdish nationalist parties. While the top-down approaches of the 
KDPS and Xoybûn make it reasonable for them to organise against one power 
hierarchy by collaborating with another.  
What the Moroud and the Comrades win by not having to compromise ideals, they 
may eventually lose by vanishing into stronger movements. Arguably the Moroud 
movement was strongest in the beginning of the anti-colonialist struggle against the 
French Mandate. They initiated the Kurd Dargh revolution of 1936 that continued 
until 1940, but was later absorbed by the Syrian independence movement.255 Whether 
a similar development will happen to the Comrades is too early to evaluate. However, 
in contentious politics perspectives it is emphasised, to not look at mobilisation as 
distinct events, than rather as processes that develop through time, which points to the 
connection between the two movements as well as to future bottom-up cross-cultural 
mobilisations. 
The KDPS and the Xoybûn on the other hand, are from a mobilisation perspective 
able to show influence by their respective movements and capabilities of generating 
resources from international actors. The dependency on foreign support have made 
both parts vulnerable to changes in international relations since the foreign part 
almost always will protect its own interests above the interests of the part that is 
dependent on support. This seems evident in the case of the KDPS in its relation with 
the KDP and the Coalition. 
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Interestingly, the autonomous developments under the PYD seem to point in 
directions that could both support what Joost Jongerden considers bottom-up changes 
of the Democratic Autonomy, its separation from sovereign powers and the people’s 
“rule of everyone by everyone”,256 and the top-down construction of one party’s rule 
over a small region, which is more in tune with the non-PYD supporters perceptions 
of the developments. 
6.3.6 Beneath the Framing 
The research participants are very much aware of the differences between the 
ideological framing of a given movement or party and the actual practices. They use 
much time on discussing underlying agendas and connections between different parts 
of the Syrian and regional actors. The attempt to navigate and clarify the differences 
between discourses and practices, I will argue is a skill that has been trained and 
practised in the Syrian context, due to the authoritarian system of the regime. It is an 
act that Lisa Wedeen has pointed to in her study of the Syrian regime, of the enforcing 
of the public to act ‘as if’ the people believe in the system.257 Where Wedeen’s 
approach is mainly top-down, I turn her concept around within an bottom-up analysis, 
arguing that the acting ‘as if’ seems to have affected the perspectives of the 
participants, who do not rely on politically framed discourses, but search for more 
deep-rooted connections by interpreting the practices of the political actors. 
 
In general, the search for underlying connections and agendas has penetrated the 
different expounding of the Syrian uprising. From day one the Syrian regime called 
the revolution sectarian and Islamist controlled, and since then claims about the 
uprising being instigated by CIA, Turkey, Saudi Arabia or Iran have been pushed.  
Besides the negative consequence of moving the focus away from Syrian actors’ 
agency, it points to the general tendency of trying to look behind the proverbial 
curtain.  
The possibilities of uncovering agendas and colour-changing connections between 
powerful actors seem as something of a Sisyphus struggle. Each time a connection is 
tracked, another connection seems to contradict, and the boundary between the 
conspiratorial mind of a layman, and a qualified analysis built on deep-seated 	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experiences is blurred. In any case, it underlines the importance of the relations 
between power and truths claim, coined by Michel Foucault.258 Arguably in the 
differences between framing and practice, lay both sophisticated possibilities of 
suppression, but also resistances in the shape of scrutinising and dissent. 
6.3.6.1 Flagging Messages 
The participants not affiliated with the PYD point to many interpretations in relation 
to insider observations, connected to symbols such as flags and memorial days. 
Ras describes how he was arrested for the first time by the PYD in Nap during a 
demonstration arranged by the KDPS, in memory of the chemical attack on 
Halabja.259 The Asayish shot live ammunition in order to disperse the demonstrators, 
and since Ras questioned their methods, he was arrested. He says: 
[T]he Asayish all of them carry flags of the PYD, the symbol and the flag for 
the PYD. So if the Asayish is not controlled by the PYD, why do they carry 
the PYD flag? Why do all the centers and offices here in Nap have the flag of 
the PYD and the picture of Öcalan?260  
 
As elaborated earlier, the KDPS is considered the strongest political opponent to the 
PYD, due to its partial affiliation with the KDP in Iraq, and their political activities 
have been constrained by the PYD on different occasions. The incidence sketched by 
Ras functions as a good example of how geopolitical symbolism is outplayed in the 
Syrian-Kurdish context. The way in which the chemical attack on Halabja is 
considered a national memorial day by Ras, but also how the historical event, when it 
is commemorated in Nap in 2012, and supporters of the KDPS are arranging it, seems 
to be a great provocation for the PYD that the Asayish threatens demonstrators with 
live ammunition, and conduct arrests. According to Ras, the PYD seizure of control 
over the areas shows itself both through demonstrations of physical power, such as by 
his own arrest, but also in the symbolic power of flags and pictures. Flags and pictures 
that point in the opposite direction than of an actual power sharing, combined with the 
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actions of the Asayish, it seems to be in the political interests solely of the PYD party, 
and not in the interests of all the people in the areas, as claimed by the PYD.261  
 
The revolutionaries are also very persistent on interpreting the meaning of the lack of 
the public displaying of the Syrian independence flag,262 which has been considered 
the flag of the Syrian uprising. Ras says:  
Inside the offices of the Yekiti you find the independence flag, but in your life 
you will never see anybody from the Yekiti saying they believe in the Syrian 
revolution.263  
His point is that a party such as the Yekiti uses a perceived support for the Syrian 
uprising as a positive image, but in practice they blindly follow the lead or the rules of 
the PYD. An argument Ras takes further, on a different occasion, where he states that 
the lack of the independence flag in the public becomes a symbol of the PYD-
controlled areas being in support of the regime.264 No independence flag and no 
fighting with the regime, leads Ras to conclude that it is a signal to the regime and the 
Coalition, that the PYD-controlled areas indirectly support the regime. 
 
Zaza from the KDPS backs the point, Ras made, by telling how the regime 
approached him during his arrest in the beginning of the uprising: 
I was arrested by the Syrian regime’s security services, and do you know what 
they told me directly? ‘Go and do demonstrations, but do not lift the flag of 
the revolution, don’t show any relation to Homs, just lift the flag of 
Kurdistan’. The policies in the Kurdish areas of today, the thing about lifting 
the Kurdistan flag, and not having any relationship with the revolution, this is 
how the Syrian security services wanted it.265 
 
Besides the symbolic support of the regime position, arguably the way the situation is 
developing in the PYD-controlled areas, also fits the interests of the regime, both 
because the regime has saved resources by not fighting the YPG, and because of the 
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cross fighting in the liberated areas between the YPG the FSA and some of the 
Islamist groups, which has weakened them all.  
 
Abu Nub backs the insinuations of a non-announced ban of the independence flag in 
the PYD-controlled areas. He says, that if the independence flag was allowed, they 
would immediately hold demonstrations in Nap in support of the joint uprising, and 
the fact that it is not allowed, questions the supposed level of democracy in the 
area.266 
6.3.7 They change the Kurdishness in Me 
Throughout the analysis, the current and historical processes have been explored 
through the words and perceptions of the discussion participants, and the lines 
between the individuals and the group sentiments have been drawn and redrawn. The 
idea of displaying the differing arguments has been in this sense to challenge the 
ethnicism of Kurdishness, but at the same time give space for expressions of 
nationalist sentiments in whatever form it is expressed by the participants.  
The words of the participants reflect deep considerations of relations between 
racialising processes in historic and current continuous developments in Syria. The 
shapes of nationalisms and politics of interests of the Syrian uprising, seems to cause 
both racialised hierarchies and to contribute to the circle of distrust. Since the merging 
of culture, politics and racialised ideology is highly charged and at the risk of being 
both exclusive and discriminating.  
Between the individuals and the group the field of tension arises that arguably both 
the revolutionaries and the PYD attempt to target through bottom-up organising. 
Whether one perceives the Democratic Autonomy project as mainly led by Kurdish 
ethno-nationalism or as everybody’s rule over everybody depends on the 
interpretation of the practices of the PYD. In the very first lines of the new 
Democratic Autonomy constitution, the Charter of the Social Contract,267 it is written 
that it represents all ethnicities in Syria and they are considered equal parts of the 
project. The civil society organisation, Tev-Dem, seems to represent the practice of 
this sort of plurality. 268  
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Within the PYD Democratic Autonomy project however, racilialising elements of 
Kurdishness exist through the PYD party’s history of struggling for Kurdish rights, as 
expressed in the dominating function of the Kurdish language and the fact that the 
areas by the PYD are called Rojava, which means Western Kurdistan. These 
contradictions in the ideology of the PYD party are disguised in the constitution, but 
put forward by the strong Kurdish elements in the structures, along with the fact that 
powerful organisations such as the Asayish and the PYD party seem to be in the 
hands of the Kurdish-speaking members. These structures point to the inherent 
problems of ethnicism that Abbas Vali discusses,269 and which potentially violates 
claims of everybody’s rights to self-expression. 
 
Zaza from the KDPS concludes at one point that all Kurds are dreaming of a 
Kurdistan, and he claims that he has never felt Syrian in any ways. His support for the 
Syrian uprising was for “his humanity” and not a political project of Syrian unity.270 
While Zaid from the Kurdish Youth Movement challenges this position, by arguing 
that he is more similar to his Syrian co-citizens than to a Sorani-speaking Kurd from 
Iraqi Kurdistan,271 and the Kurdish parties’ politicisation of Kurdish culture and 
history is a way that in his words: “change the Kurdishness in me”.272 
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7 Conclusion 
The epistemological challenge of not making yet another truth-claim on the 
developments in Syria, and specifically on the PYD-controlled areas, is stressed 
throughout the thesis in a consistent reflective form. The reflexivity operates on three 
different trajectories: The first trajectory appears through the method of reflective 
discussions that takes place between the research participants and I in December 2013 
in Nap. The second one takes shape through the analysis of a specific reflexive 
individualism that, as I have argued, appears among the participants, who are free of 
any party restrictions. The final and third trajectory follows the flow of the textuality 
of the thesis. The discussions between the participants have been transformed from 
their original context and are now in a different frame, but the style is upheld and 
differing arguments are included, so as not to construct a simplified narrative. 
 
In the analysis, I point out, that both the regime and the Kurdish parties have been 
strengthened from the establishment of the autonomous rule in the PYD-controlled 
areas. Though the KDPS party seem to be one of the parties that despite a significant 
amount of both local and foreign support, only carries a marginalised role in the 
recent changes. It relates to the negotiations among the Kurdish parties, that have 
implemented new regulating structures, which both through bureaucracy and physical 
power, uphold the PYD rules.  
The bottom-up social organising of the TCK, and the civil organisation of the Tev-
Dem, have seemingly both been strengthened during the Syrian uprising and after the 
PYD has taken control over the three cantons. While the TCK is an organisation of 
the Kurdish-speaking community, the Tev-Dem involves a plurality of communities 
presented in the PYD-controlled areas, but cooperation with the PYD is applicable for 
both.  
The Comrades on the contrary, in a movement’s perspective, is on the path of 
demobilisation. Similar to the TCK they have mobilised around the Syrian uprising, 
but did so without applying to the PYD, which in order to function as a movement in 
PYD-controlled areas seems essential. The violence of the Syrian uprising has 
detached the connections between group members of the Comrades, and in this sense, 
it is not only the top-down approaches of the PYD that demobilises the Comrades, but 
also the development of the uprising itself, exemplified in the limiting consequences 
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of the top-down structures of the Coalition and noted by the Comrades as a political 
obstruction. 
 
Along the lines of the theoretical arguments of Charles Tilly, I argue that a clear 
division between the armed parts of the PYD and the “governing” part of the PYD 
would mitigate PYD’s political misuse of violence. This also counts for the 
connection between the general social and political organising in the PYD-controlled 
areas and the PYD party. A clearer division between the Tev-Dem and the PYD party 
would make the current misleading role of the Tev-Dem nonpartisan. 
Since the PYD, according to the ideology of Abdullah Öcalan, struggles to implement 
a system ruled from the bottom-up, the points of criticism from social and political 
organisations, such as the TCK and the Comrades, should be prioritised and 
integrated according to PYD’s own principles. In this sense the idea of a ‘thought 
revolution’, which is desired by all participants, becomes a crucial event in the 
development of the Democratic Autonomy. It can be imagined that along with the 
separatist self-organisation of women, who take a strong part on different levels of the 
Democratic Autonomy project as an independent organising group, the civil society 
could have a positive self-determining position.  
 
The thesis engages a racialised field, and by practising double research273 it allowed 
nuances of historical and spatial couplings as well as expressions of collective 
experiences of Kurdishness. The Syrian colonial history points to racialising paths, 
which has made it convenient for an elite to uphold leading positions through 
organising themselves in racialised hierarchies. The dream of Kurdistan is an 
interesting vision that although shared by many is still rather undefined. It sets a 
framing, where each subject or political organising can dream of different forms of 
fulfilment. By its name, “Kurdistan”, it has an excluding resonance, which has 
incorporated a racialising default, similar to “the Syrian Arab Republic”, which states 
the rights of a certain group in accordance to one’s native tongue or even an idea of a 
primordial origin. Kurdish nationalism as it has been outplayed by the Kurdish parties 
has ratified the leading position of party leaders, but the negotiating methods of these 
leaders has on several occasions caused discontent among the general Kurdish-
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speaking community because the negotiating terms seem to be about confirming the 
parties’ leading positions rather than the common interests of the community.  
 
The violent turn of the Syrian uprising has caused demographic changes, and 
increased racialising discourses, which continuously has turned the different 
communities in Syria in on themselves. This is a process, which is applicable for the 
case of the Syrian Kurdish-speaking community, where a racialising process takes 
place due to internal displacements, which are causing more members from the 
Kurdish-speaking community to move to PYD-controlled areas, and in this sense 
consolidate the areas as Kurdish. This is even further enforced by the political choices 
of the Democratic Autonomy project of going a third way, neither in an alliance with 
the Syrian regime nor with the Coalition. Though the Democratic Autonomy project 
upholds the third way to be implicit in the radical democratic project, meaning not to 
be an organising project only for the Kurdish-speaking community, it paradoxically 
disguises the fundamental Kurdish elements of the struggle.  
The noticeable point is whether a ‘thought revolution’ will be allowed to pervade the 
Democratic Autonomy and the PYD party to a degree, where there is room for 
changes that do not directly resonate with the writings of Abdullah Öcalan, but 
actually implement reflexive individualism as a method for building group structures 
in processes of continuous change. 
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9 Appendix 
9.1 Abbreviations 
 
Syria 
Coalition Syrian National Coalition (officially known as the National Coalition 
of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces) 
KDPS Kurdistan Democratic Party of Syria (among the Syrian Kurdish-
speaking community known as al-Party) 
KNC  Kurdish National Council 
PYD  Democratic Union Party 
PCWK  The Peoples’ Council of Western Kurdistan 
SKC  Supreme Kurdish Committee 
SKDU  Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union 
SNC Syrian National Council  
TCK  Kurdish Youth Movement 
Yeketi Kurdish Democratic Union Party in Syria 
YPG/YPJ Peoples’ Protection Unit (where YPJ is the name of the women 
separatist unit, but in this thesis YPG will be the collective name of the 
armed front, since this was how it appeared in the words of the 
participants) 
 
Iraq 
KRG  Kurdistan Regional Government 
KDP  Kurdistan Democratic Party 
PUK  Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 
Peshmerga The word for self-sacrificing soldier in Kurdish, but also the common 
slang of the joined armed unit of the KRG 
Turkey 
KCK  Unions of Communities in Kurdistan 
PKK  Kurdistan Workers’ Party 
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9.2 Selected Parts of the Transcripts 
As stated in the methodology I only include the parts of the transcribed discussions 
that I refer directly to in the thesis. Bellow is the discussions parts of the eight 
participants listed, and in the beginning of each part I list who is present in the room 
of the discussion, and where it took place. 
 
9.2.1 Abu Ras Talks 
Present: Harriet Ida, Lina, Abu Ras, Im Ras and Ras 
Place: The house of Im Ras and Abu Ras in the Nap countryside 
9.2.1.1 First Abu Ras Talk 
1 
We as a Kurdish people, we demanded and talked. Of course a lot of political 
statements came out, that the revolution has to begin in Damascus not in Aleppo, not 
in Idlib. If we want to overthrow the regime we have to overthrow it in Damascus, not 
in Aleppo, or in Idlib. What are the relation of Idlib and Aleppo? What is there 
business? They have to work over there [in Damascus]. If we want to demonstrate we 
will demonstrate in front of the palace. As Kurds in the time where our leadership was 
in prison, we would arrange demonstrations in front of the of the state security office 
in Aleppo or the palace of the republic we would make demonstrations. The Arabic 
parties they laughed at us, saying you are sectarian. You are terrorists, why, because 
we make a demonstration before the republican palace? I want to make a 
demonstration in front of the Nap police station? What should the Nap police station 
do? What are their roles? They don’t have a role. The overthrow of the regime begin 
in Damascus and not here. 
This was the difference, and they did not give us the agenda and where will the armed 
movements, where it will reach? They did not answer us. Therefor the Kurdish 
movement declared the decision that we are against the armed work. We are not with 
it. The situation developed negatively, the Kurdish political movement said yes we 
are with the revolution in a clear command; we are with the revolution against the 
regime. Yes I am with it, but I am not participating in it.  I am not convinced, because 
they will make our area, Nap area, into the same as Idlib and Aleppo. All of it is 
destruction. The destruction is not creating committed people. Who will be 
commited? Nobody. We are convinced by this a 100 percent. 
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All this destruction is not bringing us anything, therefor reached this point. 
 
9.2.1.2 Second Abu Ras Talk 
2 
We as the Yekiti party, we are with PYD, we are not like the KDPS. The KDPS is 
deeming it self, or see it self, as a part of the Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party. Iraqi 
Kurdistan Democratic Party they want to work here? No they don’t have any business 
here. I want to have politics here. What happens to the people here? I am not 
accepting the politics to be determined by Barzani, come give me money for the 
movement of the KDPS.  
We are the only party until now that did not accept any money, from any foreign side, 
at all. We denied even a piaster. There are sides and countries that offered us 100 of 
million dollars, take them just work against those, who are they? Now the members of 
PKK who are they? The children of your villages, the children of your cities, the 
children of your country. 
 
9.2.1.3 Third Abu Ras Talk 
3  
Your questions I like them a lot, because it is societal, but you have the thoughts of 
the West, you have been living over there, you have not lived here, the human that has 
nothing can not move, you have no money, you come to me and say Abu Ras lets 
open a company. I say welcome yes lets open a company. But where are the money, 
and you say I don’t have, then how will we open a company? Could that be? Zero and 
a million could they together build a company? 
 
4   
That is why I say you often think with a European mind, because you lived in a very 
civilised way with high culture, this is natural for you to think it is my right to think. 
But here you don’t have the right to think, what should you think? You? There was a 
period I bought a pair of trousers, I bought these, I am a king, no one else from the 
people can buy these kinds of trousers, and if you buy them you will get beaten. You 
will get killed. Why?  
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The ones, who have lived under these circumstances, cannot think like the free mind, 
the one who had freedom and saw the life in freedom. If I did not eat banana, and you 
talked about banana, I would say what is this banana. How can I describe the taste of 
banana if I did not eat it? If I have not seen freedom, how can I know freedom? When 
we talk, as a political movement, in the beginning of our movement when we talked, 
the general people would look like this and say, really this is what will happened?  
As an example in our party we issued a lot of decisions the student would stop his 
party activities during the exams, we don’t want politics from you, you are a student 
here with us in the party, you should not come here to the party, it is forbidden. You 
should go and study in your house. Study for the examinations. If you achieved a 
certificate it will support the party and the society, we launched such decisions. A lot. 
And these generations came out of it. But where is the luck, we don’t have stuff or 
money. Money I give them from my livelihood, and this from my livelihood. We are 
the first ones to die. The dead will not raise the dead. This is difficult no? 
 
9.2.2 Ras Talks 
Present: Ras, Harriet Ida and Lina 
Place: First Ras talk takes place in one of the rooms in the house of the Nub family 
and second talk takes place in the car of Abu Ras. 
9.2.2.1 First Ras Talk 
5 
The situation in Ava and Dakmas is a mixed character, there are Christians, 
Armenians, there are Alawis, this is the nature of this area in Oas, and people began to 
participate with us, and they started to be a part of us, and become active with us. 
The beginning of the revolution took place in the countryside, the outskirts not inside 
the cities. So we began to work with relief, we would take some youth from other 
areas, we would gather some blood, bring the cups of blood and bring it to the 
countryside in the north.  
Then it began in Nasa and we would begin to bring the wounded from that area to 
Ava, we made an agreement with the Ava hospital that we would bring the wounded 
people 
There began to come internal displaced to Ava we began to work with the Schools, 
there were 9 schools with us, the internal displaced we would prepare the schools for 
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them, we worked with the organised “Yus” at that time, and also other organisations 
and relief organisations as well. 
Of course all of the youth who worked with us was all volunteers, no one got payment 
until now there is nobody who gets payment, there is no one in the Comrades who 
gets a salary all of us are volunteering in the work.  
In general we made a lot of demonstrations until now we do. And we made a lot of 
“Graffiti” campaigns, at that time we worked against the PYD because the PYD 
controlled areas and they were collaborating with the regime, they did these kinds of 
things. Then we began the campaign that against the idea of sectarian Islam that 
happened and still is going on, while you are also present. 
We entered the regional council of Oas by elections and the Kurdish block. Now we 
have withdrawn from the area as something new, we have withdrawn from the 
council in Oas, now the chairs have become hmm it is true that the ideas of the 
Comrades is like this but part of the ideas of the Comrades is that people should have 
their rights as they are them self like the rights are for them. 
The representation in the council before it was expanded there was 31 chairs to the 
Kurdish block after the expansion it became 20%, instead of making an expansion for 
the Kurds it changed so the Kurds only got 14 chairs in all the area Oas, Ibar and Nap, 
after that we said enough we don’t want that kind of things, even though part of the 
chairs was ours, we will not stay on them, we decided to withdraw. 
 
6 
Ras: They are cooperating by not protesting against it, yes it is true that the 
independence flag is at their office, or in their speeches they are saying they are with 
the revolution. But they are with the regime and agreeing with the regime in the sense 
that we are not doing anything against the regime, we are not doing anything against 
the regime any movements, we are not doing anything that could be perceived… they 
are supporters of the regime in a hidden way, when you led a complete area not fight 
the regime, this in itself is supporting the regime. Without anything else anything 
militant or like it, you are just not letting people participating in the revolution you are 
in this way with the regime. The movements besides the Comrades that has tried to do 
something, not only us who tried, but the suppression that has taken place, the 
fighting in a societal way, the societal fighting, if you look at the the Comrades people 
many of the people are suffering, people that are not responding to their parents, there 
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are people who became sick, because what happened was all of them is like, ok Ras 
“Stop”, they came and threatened me saying we will burn down your place, we will 
kill you and so on we will kidnap you and we will do so and so. And I was like ok 
you will do what you want to do, what they do is that they go to the parents, either 
they make the parents fear what could happened to me, they started sending people to 
my family or my friends families, saying your son will be killed your son will be 
kidnapped, in an indirect way 
 
9.2.2.2 Second Ras Talk 
7  
In our village, there are people who support the PYD. They know how the situation is 
for my family and they know how the economical situation is for our neighbours as 
well. They come to our house and then they know how much money the people have 
and how much this year brought then according to that they take a part of it 
 
8  
Ras: The day they arrested me? It was not about the Arabs but about the Kurdish 
cause, it was the day of the memorial day of the Halabja the day where Sadam he 
massacred the Kurds. The PYD had a problem with this demonstration because the 
KDPS, the group for Barzani, they went out to the streets, and I was with them. In its 
ground the Halabja day is a national day and every year we go to the streets for its 
memory. I went out with them. The PYD or the Asayish came and shut life 
ammunition in the air, people fled but I did not leave, I asked them why they were 
shooting, and then they arrested me. 
You even see it on the video, the Asayish all of them carry flags of the PYD, the 
symbol and the flag for the PYD. So if the Asayish is not controlled by the PYD, why 
do they carry the PYD flag?  Why all the centres and offices here in Nap have the flag 
of the PYD and the picture of Öcalan? It should be either the Kurdish Supreme 
Committee or the flag of Kurdistan. The flag of all the Kurdish people or the flag of 
the people representing the area. Here you saw it the centre that we entered there was 
the flag of the PYD and the picture of Öcalan. And if you go to the Asayish it is the 
same and if you go to the media it is the same, the checkpoints, even the checkpoints 
and you saw the cars of the Asayish it is all the PYD and the picture of Öcalan. Even 
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at the barrel it is written PKK. Ok and on all the walls at the schools you see that it is 
written Apo, Apo, Apo, how is this possible, you are all the people? No you are not 
all the people, but half the people are afraid and don’t want to talk. Not all the people 
are PYD and not all the people are Yekiti. 70 % of the people here are not political 
they are normal people who wants to live, eat, drink and work and study and make a 
life. No there is nothing like this, the people are on a silent stage or the Sadisa they 
pretend to be with the PYD to be able to relax, so they are not exposed to troubles. So 
when they go and buy bread, because everything even the ovens and the bread is for 
the people who are with the PYD. Even it is not a demand that you are political but 
people who supports the PYD, it is the same as the time of the regime when the 
people pretended that they supported the regime, now all the people pretend to be 
PYD in order to be relaxed and to be able to live. Now I could put the flag of the PYD 
on my car and then at the checkpoints they don’t search the car, then they are like go. 
And so on… 
 
9  
There are no clear political project, you talk with some people and they tell you that 
we [the Kurds] have a project together with the Alawies, and then there are the people 
that say that we want to create a great Kurdistan. But how can it both be about 
creating the greater Kurdistan and in the same time you [the PYD] work for united 
Syrian politics? It is the same when we talked with the people from the PYD office, 
Nah she first told you that they want the greater Kurdistan and then she said that our 
project is political and we don’t want to divide Syria, how can these two things fit 
together?  
 
10  
The FSA and the Islamic front they have the suicide missions in the name of Islam 
and the paradise and the virgins. The YPG also use suicide missions, but they don’t 
have a paradise, they are going to die and they don’t know anything else than they are 
going to die. You see this ability with the leaders to control the people, how can I put 
it, they are winning the people through the Kurdish cause. For the idea of the greater 
Kurdistan. But the greater Kurdistan will not take place. The people talk about the 
division and the opening of the borders or even no borders, but you cannot say in 
2014 that a greater Kurdistan will be build. It is impossible, and like this the PKK will 
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stay strong, you gave them a dream and a hope for justice in the Middle East, how 
many years will it take to reach justice and a state? And you see the Kurds and the 
Arabs and the tribes together. In a 100 years it will not happened here with us, even if 
there was installed a law, and all the citizen was in the first level, but the same people 
will not be able to depend on each other.  
The Kurds will not trust the Arab and the Arabs will not trust the Kurds. And in this 
way our parties will stay strong and they will stay in control, and the people will stay 
in support and that they will discuss our case, and the Kurds will continue feeling that 
he is a Kurds and the Arab will feel that he is Arab, and we will continue this way. 
And you have 50-100 years ahead of you.  
And I told you, you see now what they are doing the PKK as an example when there 
is a military front they send in the kids, and people who are 14 years old who carry 
the weapons in the front, these people will for sure die, when you send a 14 year old 
kid to the front he will die, he will be the first line and go in front of the enemy, for 
the Kurdish cause and so on and he is small in age he will go with his weapon and 
die. And when he dies you will have all of his family behind you, you win a family 
and other people and you win my father who is not supporting weapons but a person 
who is civilised and into politics and think about his nation’s future but no when 
people start to carry weapons even the civilised persons will carry the weapons. Not 
because they believe in these things but because of the child that died. And this is 
what is going on. And I told you that the YPG began as a small brigade, and then they 
grew and grew and now they count a big number, and the people who support them 
are many. 
 
9.2.3 Nub Family Talks 
Present: Im Nub, Abu Nub, Nub, Val, Ras, Harriet Ida and Lina 
Place: The living room in the house of the Nub family 
9.2.3.1 First Nub Family Talk 
11   
Im Nub: Yes my father was a part of the old party called the KDPS, not the KDPS as 
it is now, the old KDPS before they divided, it is a very old party, so we grew up with 
politics. And especially with the Kurdish cause, and in the first period when PKK 
entered Syria in the beginning, not all of us were against them, in the beginning they 
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entered, like you with a positive image, we the Syrian Kurds received them, when 
they fled from Turkey and we welcomed them here, we used to live in Cad, we did 
not live in Oas, so when they [PKK] came to Cad, my father met with Öcalan in 
person, long time ago of course in the eighties. He had a closed meeting with him, at 
that time everything was secret, secret, secret, it did not work that anyone would 
know that Öcalan was in this house, it could have caused arrest. Even for the house it 
could be dangerous, because Kurdish parties was forbidden to work in Syria.  
 
12   
Im Nub: So our house was a political house, I grew up knowing about politics, I mean 
I knew things. My father gave us a part of democracy, he asked for our opinion about 
things, not like now, we meet with Arabs, we meet in a eastern way in general, in the 
meaning that we as Kurds meet up in a eastern way, because our traditions is like 
theirs. The woman, her role is marginalised you [as a woman] should not talk about 
politics, but we were not like that, when we grew up it was not like that; it was normal 
that we would give our opinions. I as a woman did not arrive at this point with ease. 
Even when I talk with my brother, we are all the time against each other, he is a man 
with an eastern understanding, you are a girl, it does not work that you talk like that, 
but I would tell him, I want to talk. My personal behaviour is like that also in my 
house, that is why I say the woman she has also a role to play, even me and my 
husband had problems, because of my behaviour in the house. There is nothing 
coming to you like; here you go here is a golden dish, take it this is your freedom. 
There is nobody who will give it to you. If you alone don’t say this is my rights, and I 
want them, nobody will give them to you, or say to you take them. So even my 
husband even though we love each other, in the beginning the traditions in his house 
was different from our traditions. We [from the family home] have a little more 
freedom than they do, in their house-environment. So in the beginning there were 
problems in this matter. ”It does not work with this personality”, “your behaviour is a 
little free”, “you talk with boys”, or “there is men present please don’t talk”.  
Our eastern society if there are men the woman should not talk too much, she should 
respect. I was against this – and now this attitude of my husband has past. 
 
13   
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So the PKK now we don’t say that they are positive, but in this perspective no they 
actually contributed positively, they enter the house and tell the woman why are you 
quiet, why don’t you talk, they say to a girl e.g. come here why does your brother 
have an opinion about everything, and you don’t have an opinion, you should perform 
you personality, you should have a strong personality, you should not be 
marginalised, you should demand you rights, you are like your brother. In this field 
they work, in other places in my opinion they have problems, on the political issues, 
but on the social issues no, there are things where they worked, and did something for 
the Kurdish society. E.g. they gave the woman her space in the demonstrations, they 
go out in demonstrations, and even in the political work there are more women, and 
she is taking her role in many fields. 
 
14   
Im Nub: In the beginning of the revolution they did not come out in demonstrations 
they have a leadership of a big amount of people, we can not criticise anything now, 
lets say here in Nap if they go out on a demonstration, you would see a lot of people. 
All of it is PYD, there is a mass behind them, as example, in Ibar they came out in 
support of the revolution, in Ues they came out, but they did not come out a lot 
[PYD], they put up the flag [of the revolution] a couple of people, but if they came 
out as the masses they are a lot of people. They could come out, but they are here in 
Nap, we the opposition, the Kurdish part of the opposition with the revolution. When 
the youth went to the streets immediately they [PYD] arrested the youth. They did not 
led them go out. They said we have no connection, we are the Kurds, but how come 
we have no connection, we are living in Syria how come we have no connection. In 
the end I am a citizen of Syria how can I not have a connection. If I am Kurdish my 
nation is not alone, I am living with the Syrian people. Responding or not, we are 
together, we who are with the revolution could not go out.  
Abu Nub: Ras and me went to the demonstration and got to prison. 
Im Nub: Yes, before there was a demonstration in Nap, immediately they arrested 
them. They did not talk anything against the PYD. They said things against the 
regime, they asked for the regime and Bashar to be overthrown. They arrested the 
people, that did not say anything against the PYD, why are you angry? We did not 
gather because of you. You should be with us, not against us, you should also get out 
to the streets. In this way their position did not please me. 
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Abu Nub: Can I say something? My village Aqiba, the FSA wanted to come to my 
village, Ok? When the FSA withdrew the PYD arrested nine persons who were all 
engineers, why? Because they cooperated with the FSA. And they were exposed to 
beating and torture you know. All of them got a week or ten days, in the end one was 
writing a report saying that these people did cooperate with the FSA, and… 
Im Nub: One of them is the brother for Nan who was here, the friend of Nub one of 
them is his brother an engineer. And the PYD imprisoned them on the accusation that 
they cooperated with the FSA.  
Abu Nub: The amount of educated people are small in the PYD, their supporters is all 
non educated and ignorant people, the peasants, the gardeners, the worker, you tell 
them two words and… It is different with the people educated at the university you 
cannot control them like this, they are in the PYD but very few. 
H: What would be the problem if they cooperated with the FSA? 
Abu Nub: It does not work, you should work with the PKK it does not work that you 
work with the FSA. You give them information about us. 
Im Nub: It is like you work as a spy.  
Abu Nub: Of course this is a lie, all of it is a lie. But because they are not with the 
FSA, PKK saw it as their opportunity and to make them problem. 
 
15   
Abu Nub: They come and knock on the door, Abu Nub, you should pay 1000 lira. 
One household will pay in a year 40.000 lira, a household that is exchanging money, 
100.000 Syrian lira, a place for olive oil extraction they take 200.000 sl, a doctor pays 
taxes. 
H: You did not pay? What if you do not want to pay? 
Abu Nub: For me they did not come yet, but they will come soon. 
Im Nub: If you don’t pay I guess they close the place.  
Abu Nub: The second time they turn up they bring weapons. You have to pay. 
Im Nub: Like a state is bringing the police 
Abu Nub: But what are they using this money for? They are going to buy weapons so 
they can beat up each other. I don’t want this. For the weapons there are countries that 
can give you. 
Im Nub: This tax is not for them to sort out the area, to bring electricity and water and 
we want to make for you this and this- no. It is all for the weapons and you don’t 
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know, it is probably also for their pockets. 
Abu Nub: For sure.  
Im Nub: They take it for them self. One part for weapons and one part for them self. 
 
16   
Im Nub: On the subject of their authoritarian behaviour I will give you and example 
of what happened to me. The local councils put forward candidates, every area has to 
nominate a candidate, Nub and Val [her sons], and their friends suggested that I and 
another person should be nominated. Me and another person, I said ok because the 
local council is about services, social issues, the economy all issues that concerns the 
area, yes it also returns to politics but I don’t want to work with politics I want to 
work with the issues of the local council.  
Even the people who are the closest to me told me that I should not do it, then you 
will be arrested by the PYD, and they will take you, and you have two boys maybe 
they will kill you. These people are the closest to me and the local council is not 
supposed to be a political position. It is true that in the end everything becomes 
politics, but it is work in the area you know, from the corner of taking care of the 
electricity, the water the schools, services. Issues that will serve the area and despite 
this all the people said nononono, but I continued to work for it, but in the end I am 
sorry the coordinating council for the regional office they reduced the seats for the 
Kurds, so the organising possibilities of the Kurds was diminished. The Comrades 
members withdrew from the council; since the seats in general in the council were 
expanded, but the seats for the Kurds was diminished. The seats of the Kurds were 31 
and they diminished it to 14 seats and they [the Kurds] refused and withdraw since 
they did not agree, so the Kurds withdrew from the local Oas council. So as 
representatives of Nap there is no one for this council, we withdrew. 
 
17   
H: Here in Nap are there local organising committees? 
Im B: No 
Abu Nub: In Nap there is only PYD 
H: Who is forbidding these? 
Abu Nub: It is forbidden 
H: But today this Nah she said that there is bottom-up organising committees 
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Ras: No her idea is not that there is organising committees only their own party 
committees.  
Im Nub: Now they see them self as a state so everything is for them. 
Ras: She said that they have organising committees that are local. 
Abu Nub: There is the Tev-Dem 
Im Nub: Again you want to realise that everything is for the PYD 
Ras: They have an office and that is it. 
H: In her opinion this Tev-Dem is not PYD, she explained it as a network, as a 
committee of the people. 
Im Nub: But this is not the reality, all of it belongs to the PYD. You should not listen 
to the pretentious words. They put forward some words; you remember when I told 
you how I have to be clever to give critiques. They know you as foreigners, then they 
also know how to talk with you. You Europeans how do you think and then they try 
to present themselves in a good manner. “They pretend that their authority is not only 
political.” 
H: But in reality these committees are present? 
Im Nub: They are present but the members are working for the PYD. It is true that 
they work but who are they, they are not democratic, coming from different parties 
such as Azadi and Yekiti and one from the KDPS. Me as the opposition I am neither 
KDPS nor Yekiti, and there should be this amount of members. 
H: Do you know who is working in the different committees? 
Abu Nub: You mean names of the person? 
H: Do you know who is responsible in this area for the electricity and its like? They 
said there were committees for all the areas? 
Abu Nub: There is, there are people I know who works in these fields but not what 
they do exactly. 
H: If you had a problem here, whom would you turn to? 
Im Nub: There is no electricity from the state, and the water you have to buy yourself 
for your own money from private persons. Me as a Kurdish citizen here, the PYD do 
nothing for me, my son is in a private school and it is all private money, now if I get a 
problem there is no one to turn to, except if it has a political character. If they arrest 
me, or someone from my family, in this instance maybe you turn to them 
Abu Nub: Then you go to the Asayish 
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Im Nub: Me as a normal citizen in Nap, has no rights to electricity, water or bread or 
schooling- it all comes down to money. 
H: There is no one who uses these committees? 
Ras: They don’t have any work. 
Im Nub: There is no work, all of Nap has generators and the water you need to buy, 
there is no chances that the PYD will do anything it is all up to the regime. PYD do 
not have a water company 
H: What do the civil society do? 
Ras: They cerate seminars, and they have a cultural center and they do seminars and 
of course other people do not go, only the PYD supporters 
Im Nub: According to the talk of the PYD they are protecting the area against the 
attacks of Islamic State (IS). And that we live in safety and stability because the YPG 
is present if the YPG did not protect us we would all be IS now, they are all about 
security and stability and they are providing us this. All about the economy is going to 
be used in the fight against IS and FSA, since they are the ones who is creating the 
blockade and it is not the PYD that is the problem.  
Everything that is bad is IS and the FSA and all that is good is PYD 
Abu Nub: the Tev-Dem only focus on how to take the money from the people your 
house will pay 1000 lira and that place pay 10.000 and now they collect these money 
so they can create a state with money. 
Im Nub: Now they are coming out with decisions that we have to pay taxes 
Abu Nub: This is the Tev-Dem, and me as a citizen do not receive any services from 
the PYD or the civil society of the PYD, they don’t provide me with any service, only 
that they are protecting us against IS. This is the only positive work they do 
 
18   
Im Nub: At some point there fell a bomb in Nap, Nub and his friend went there and 
took pictures, because the bomb fell and a house was destroyed, is there any [PYD] 
politics in this story, you know a bomb fell. They arrested Nub and his friend and told 
them you cannot take pictures of this. And they wrote them a condition saying that 
they could not go and take pictures again.  
Abu Nub: Why? 
Im Nub: Only Ronahi can take pictures and reports, the channel for the PYD, only 
they can document. This is an explosive I want to upload it on the Internet, Nap is 
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under attack. No, that you cannot do, that means that you are from a certain front and 
someone sent you to document. 
Abu Nub: This is a question you can present for the Asayish, don’t forget it, if they 
tell you we are a democracy and so on, tell them one thing, allow people to do 
demonstrations and rise the flag of the revolution.  
If they say yes, - we are ready and we will do demonstrations. Ask them if the 
revolutionary flag is allowed? Don’t forget that question, if there is a discussion then 
ask them if people can do a demonstration and raise the revolutionary flag 
 
9.2.3.2 Second Nub Family Talk 
19   
Abu Nub: I am with the Syrian revolution; I wish that the regime would be toppled, 
why? We should just solve that problem, in my opinion. If I had known that the 
revolution would have prolonged until this moment, and known about the problems 
that is going on, I would have been against the revolution. It caused a lot of problems; 
the food, the water, the livelihood, the housing and all the time people have to 
disperse from one area to another. I don’t want this revolution, for what is this 
revolution? The revolution was stolen; the revolution is now in the hands of Iran, 
Russia, America, France, Qatar and Saudi. There is no revolution left that leaves 
space to us, me and Ras to say what we whish for and what these and that person 
whish for. Now they want to go to the Geneva, and who will go, they say they want to 
do this, where is the ground for the revolution, the revolution should be for the people 
and they should take the decisions. Everything that happens are on the cost of the 
people, I don’t know, one is talking and talking and in the end nothing. 
 
9.2.3.3 Third Nub Family Talk 
20   
Im Nub: We will reach our rights that were not available before. We would feel that 
we are human beings, like there was once one that went out to the street and said; “I 
am a human and it is my right to live like a human being”. When we went out to the 
street, this were our demands, we did not want this destruction, but Bashar he began 
with the destruction and then the other side began to get armed.  
In the beginning when we went to the streets the first 7-8 months it was peaceful. The 
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youth from the universities and the children it was peaceful, they did not want the 
war. They wanted their rights and live like humans in Syria, and they [the regime] did 
not answer to the demands, they brought weapons and so on and then the destruction 
began. We as Syrian when we went to the streets, my city is Oas, my street I don’t 
like to go and see it, because for sure I will cry if I go and see them, I will go and see 
the tragedy, where it was before, yes it is a simple civilian neighbourhood but now it 
is destroyed, there are people I used to know them, I heard they are dead. They are 
normal people who did not arm themselves or anything, children that died from 
bombs. You hear this person I know them, that person I used to see them in the 
neighbourhood, it is a tragedy in our lives. We cannot forget it. Even though we 
welcomed the revolution, but this will stay as a memory in our brains, it is tragic, it is 
not something where we were joyful and went out, no. With the victory there is 
sadness, because there was a lot of destruction. 
 
21   
Abu Nub: The revolution has caused changes of bad practices and changes of positive 
practices. I mean before a person could not express his opinion, in the revolution I as 
a Kurdish person as an example used to say if there would be a revolution then 
tomorrow I will be able to say I am Kurdish. In the revolution I have a political 
belonging I am in a certain political party, it is supposed that I say I am in this party. 
My party would have an internal structure there are ideas well known, what we saw 
was the opposite happened. I walk and bring along my idea and it is obvious that I am 
Kurdish as an example, and if the FSA caught me or the IS, they rely on that I am 
from Nap, but I am not Kurdish.  
This is not a revolution. So what happened were complete opposite results, the one 
that present himself as the revolutionary he has become the owner of the decisions. 
The Kurds closed the roads around them and they closed the roads, and the Alawis 
closed the roads around them and they closed the roads. We had good relationships 
with the Alawis and with Christians it was good with all the people it was good. Then 
the revolution came and let us, my son Val as an example he did not know that he was 
Sunni. Val did not know and Nub did not know what is the Sunni it is Muslim, but my 
God Sunni and Alawi and Shia we did not have these divisions before, in all Syria 
there was not these divisions in general on the wide layer, and the educated layer 
there would not exist this differentiation.  
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Bashar came and worked on it, and the group of the Muslim Brothers in Syria they 
also worked on it. Not only Bashar worked on it, the two sides used it, the people who 
wanted to overthrow the revolution. The Muslim Brothers did not work well with the 
revolution. So in the revolution it is supposed that the persons are freeing their minds 
and freeing their thoughts, but on the other way around I feel that we have travelled 
backwards. 
Before I believed in the world with out borders, it is similar to the ideas of the 
communism, and now I say let me stay in Nap, and I don’t want to leave Nap. So 
everything had an opposite consequence.  
But I believe from here and ten years onwards, the right will happened in the end 
things will come right, but now the fanatics they have caught it from both sides, from 
the Baath party and from the opposition, the fanatics they are the ones that is 
destroying the revolution, it is the two that destroys it. But there will come a time 
where both of them will leave, and the normal people will have stayed and they will 
be freed, the Syrian people in general are open-minded people. Not like the Sudan or 
Libya, or even Egypt, the Syrians are open-minded towards the world. Now in this 
time the revolution got problems. 
Im Nub: I say that our revolution now wants another revolution, because the people 
was suppressed and suppressed they did not know their rights, and what the freedom 
means there are a lot of people that understand that the freedom means that I only 
want to yell out loud, no the freedom also has its limits, it has to have. Not just that I 
go to the streets and I am screaming no, you have to study the freedom, as we want it, 
there are people who don’t even know their rights, what do you want what is your 
rights, they will tell you I don’t know. How would this be, why did you join the 
revolution, our revolution still wants a revolution, to let the people understand what is 
their rights and what is their obligations as well, not just to know their rights they 
should know their obligations as well, not just that I want my rights and rights, you as 
a citizen will also have obligations, you should do it in order for the country will be 
ready to work again as a new country. So our revolution wants another revolution, to 
let the people understand that you should not only take but you should also give. Not 
only, give me, give me, give me, this country also wants to take, it wants to take. I 
mean still we want to work. 
 
22   
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Im Nub: Once I participated in a conference and I said our revolution looks like a 
woman that wants to give birth in the time where she wants to give birth how much it 
is painful, pain, pain, pain. Our revolution is only pain and until now there has been 
no birth giving relief. Until now it is only the birth point and only pain, pain, pain. 
Inside us it is moving and it is painful and painful and we want it to come out. Until 
now we did not feel the relief of having giving birth. We are still in a birth situation 
and in the pain, to be comfortable we need time. 
 
23 
Im Nub: There was a chemical attack and what did they do? The red line what did it 
do? It changed colour. 
Abu Nub: Obama said that tomorrow we will fire, but tomorrow came and the day 
after and nothing happened 
Im Nub: Of course if they intervened it would also be a tragedy, the war would grow 
Abu Nub: But it would end 
Im Nub: And it only last a bit and then it is over, either like this or like that. But our 
children have a future and now what? When will this war end? We should stay like 
this and count the days after each other? This day the FSA won and the next day the 
regime, this is not a solution  
 
24   
Ras: But most people right now say why are the people quiet? The people are not 
quiet but after three years the people got tired. Even me, you say doctor Anes told me 
today at the hospital not to enter the room because there is the picture of Öcalan, he 
told me not to enter the room, he knows me how I am. Before when I saw the picture 
of Öcalan I would make trouble, but now I just enter. Not because I saw that they 
were right, but because I have become tired and the people who are with me are tired. 
This is the reality, if somebody wants the revolution should be successful, the leading 
organisations in the end I will tell you something there is nothing called the revolution 
of people only, there are the people who is revolting and there are the people who is 
supporting this revolution, and the international society they were supposed to support 
the revolution because it was about the rights in life, and the rights of opinions and all 
these are the rights of the people. But all the European Union go out and talk about 
the IS not once the European Union talked about the violations of the PYD.  
	   94	  
Now is it not the rights of human to criticise and the right of choosing the place to live 
and the rights of which nation he wants, and within these rights there are the rights of 
property, the PYD as an example, if you go to Turkey they take over the control of 
your things, why is there no one of the rights organisations that talked about these 
things, and will not talk, not because they don’t know, no they know but they will not 
talk. The European Union is agreeing to that the PYD is in control. And the interests 
are not human no the interests are special and political interests that is available.  
I sad together with a lot of people who represent countries and I told them the same. I 
am not talking about the journalists, I am talking about the organisations, which has 
as its work the human rights and documentation and they did not say anything. And 
even the international channels, the ones that gets supports form the Emirates, and 
they are against the Kurds and they don’t talk against the PYD because they have a 
problem with the Human rights violations and not because you are a person but 
because they are channels that gets money from the political Islam and they began to 
talk against the PYD, not because of the Kurds, no one talked. 
This chaotic situation for sure it will leave people in a tired situation and then a lot of 
people started to become convinced with the Islamic caliphate, there are people who 
started to changed their ideas. There are a lot of people who comes from Europe and 
say these are terrorists and Islamist and they are sectarian. In the end with all this 
blood and all these massacres and the treacherous act of the international society and 
the organisations and all these persons that [pause] for sure there will be sectarianism, 
me as a person if my family was killed by the PYD or by the Islamist or the regime 
from any of the sides or if they died by a bomb I will become sectarian. I am 
supposed to be sectarian, not because I am sectarian in myself but because this is my 
life. 
 
9.2.4 KDPS Talk 
Present: Daw, Zaza, Zaid, Im Nub, Abu Nub, Ras, Nub, Val, Harriet Ida and Lina 
Place: The living room in the house of the Nub family 
 
25   
Zaza: Maybe I want to clarify a thing. We are not, not responding to the PYD because 
we are afraid, but in the KDPS we have an experience with these kind of things, 
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especially in Iraqi Kurdistan in 1991 when there was a no flyzone in Iraqi Kurdistan. 
In 1991 the PKK and the group of Jalal Talabani and the KDP they fought with each 
other. The KDP and PUK, Jalal Talabani, in 6-7 years they fought each other, so it 
caused thousands of martyrs. In 1992 there was an agreement done in America 
between Jalal Talabani and the KDP. We don’t want this experience to repeat itself 
and there will be another civil war between us and any other Kurdish side. Therefor 
we are laying low about many issues and even though some of our friends might be 
killed, and until now Bahazad Dursin he is a member of our political office he was 
kidnapped in Kak, an area that is controlled by the PYD. 
So we responded to this by saying you are protecting an area and you should control 
it, he is a member of a political office and he was kidnapped, until now and he is. And 
another member of a political office from Kak was killed, and PYD are controlling 
this area. And here also there is a village where a boy was attacking another village 
and one was martyred. We do not respond, and then there are the prisoners inside, and 
we cannot talk about responding because we are afraid of killings between Kurds. We 
have an earlier experience to rely on. 
 
26   
Zaid: The power of the PYD, and the situation of all the Kurdish parties, it all comes 
from the result of the time. The PKK entered Syria, and they came from Syria as a 
professional international political play. They came from Turkey to Syria as the 
Turkish-Greek relation was bad, and the Turkish-Cypress relation was bad and the 
Turkish-Bulgarian relation was bad, and the Turkish-Iranian relation was bad, and 
Turkish-Iraqi was bad, and the Turkish-Syrian relationship was bad beside the 
Arminian and the exploited the whole area for the Turkish government. They [the 
PYD] are fixed the relations around Turkey. They got a people’s leadership with the 
support of the surrounding countries.  
We will return and focus on the Syrian revolution, the PKK or the PYD interfered in 
the Syrian revolution, its repossessed name, was also a professional regional play. 
They exploited the international crannied situation of Russia and China, the Iranian 
and the Syrian. The exploited the crannied Kurdish parties, I am sorry to say, the 
reasons for the power of the PYD was because of the weakness of the Kurdish parties, 
they were not on the same ground.  
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They knew about this situation and the Syrian government supported them in this 
respect, they helped them enter the Kurdish areas to sort them selves out. The second, 
the Syrian government supported them to enter the Kurdish areas why? Because from 
the first day of the revolution when it began in Dera3, Buthaina Sha3ban said this is 
sectarian, and the Syrian government tried to play it out as a Sunni-Shia, not as a 
nationalist conflict or a one-leader regime, so they supported the PKK. The Kurdish 
parties here are with the Syrian society, and this is of course something natural since 
we do not demand a division for sure we would be in solidarity with Deraa’, and with 
Homs and be in solidarity with Hama and Idlib and so on. The PKK played with the 
interference of the nationalism, and the result of the other circumstances is that there 
are confrontations, with Masoud Barzani we do not consider him the president of 
Kurdistan, and the father of Ruhi, Mustafa Barzani, the result of former 
confrontations in Iraqi Kurdistan and the killing between Kurds, they exploited this 
point also. They exploited and attempted to injure all the Kurdish parties by the 
national conflict of Kurd against Kurd, like the fight between Arabs that happened in 
Idlib, there are all the brigades and they kill each other, and more brigades and they 
kill each other, this is also an international play. But we have the recommendations of 
the son of the father of Ruhi for the Kurds we would not want to be injured behind the 
killing among Kurds.  
The regime exploited this point, the regime exploited that we don’t want a conflict 
between Kurd and Kurd. 
 
27   
Zaid: Why should they bring one from Urfa to govern me, or one from Gaziantep to 
govern me? Why? Where is the self-management where? And the differences is under 
progress, they blew to the differences the holy thing of theirs, that is the Kurdish flag 
for them. Our Kurdish flag since 1920 has been the three colours and the sun in the 
middle and then they brought us the differences by bringing us their flags and discuss 
it. They brought it and they work as they feel like, they let us enter in a discussion to 
discuss that flag, and they work on the ground. They make organisations and they 
make this and they make and make, there are expected occurrences, which will 
happen if you change certain national things. They enter in these discussions and they 
change the Kurdishness in me and change the stars of theirs. 
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28   
Zaid: And we are united with the FSA, we as the Kurdish Youth Movement our 
members are present in the National alliance of the revolution and the Syrian 
revolutionary Coordination Union and the former Syrian National Council and current 
alliance, and in the Kurdish National Council and in the Council of Western 
Kurdistan and in the body of European that are supporting the civil society 
organisations and we work on it as members. 
We are not a party, but we are a movement. 
Daw: It is a civil society movement 
Zaid: We are present in all the points and the ground goal until now is to join the two 
councils. 
 
29  
Zaid: One and a half year there have been no demonstrations inside Nap why? 
Daw: Because there is suppression 
Zaid: Ok and the regime also used to suppress, why did you stop demonstrating? Are 
you more afraid of the PYD than the regime? In the days of the regime you went out 
to the streets, the regime has airplanes, tanks, and security intelligence, they have 
everything, and you went out. It is not logic 
Daw: Because of fear of arrest 
Zaid: Another example the kids that was killed in Dera’ and in Homs they killed 
children, I can’t tell them [the Arab opposition], ‘I did not go out because here we are 
afraid of the PYD’, ok PYD is suppressing me, ok, but the power of the PYD is that 
greater of the regime? The regime is stronger. Why are the demonstrations stronger in 
Kafranbel? 
Ras: I will tell you something, this is a question you first could ask yourself and the 
Kurdish Youth Movement, before you ask anyone else. You are the people that 
changed your revolutionary point of departure, ok. You caught the situation and 
began to take permission and all your activities you get the permission of the PYD 
and you organise with them. This is one reason. The second is that the KDPS, yes 
they changed but their point of departure was declared that they are against internal 
Kurdish confrontations. The other parties, the Yekiti as an example played the same 
game as you did, between the population they say we are revolutionaries and bring the 
independence flag in their office, in my years I have never seen them carry the 
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independence flag in the streets, and in my life I did not hear them say that they are 
revolutionaries in the streets. Inside at the office of the Yekiti you find the 
independence flag, but in your life you will never see anybody from the Yekiti or the 
others saying they believe in the Syrian revolution. And the other parties, the Azadi 
because this is its size [gesturing that it is small] you can put them in one service and 
let it drive  
 
30   
Zaid: In 1958 began the thoughts about the Arab nationalism, it changed… But we in 
40 years me and my generations and your generations, we… the regime hated the 
Syrian people, hated the Armenian for his Armenianess and the Druze for his 
Druzness and the Kurd for his Kurdishness 
Zaza: Why would we lie for our self and say that I feel I am Kurdish Syrian, no I am 
Kurdish, my belonging is not Syrian 
Zaid: I have a question, since I don’t know 
Zaza: We are lying to our self, during 40 years 
Zaid: A question 
Zaza: Just one moment let me finish the talk, during 40 years of Baath rule, you want 
to return to talk about the time of the independence, and before the Baath came, 
maybe we would feel a bit for the Syrian nation, but when you come now during 40 
years of Baath rule. I am Kurdish and I will go to the department and I would not be 
able to talk Kurdish, and will lie to myself, that I have Syrian belonging and that I am 
Kurdish but Syrian. In my opinion we are lying. 
Zaid: I have a small question you could maybe answer in honesty 
Zaza: Ok 
Zaid: Mubarak was putting forward a Syrian basketball team that played with another 
selected team, who would you support? 
Zaza: Me 
Zaid: Yes 
Zaza: I would support the other selected team, I would not feel incomplete 
Laughing 
Zaid: These feelings I did not feel 
Zaza: I would participate in the demonstrations and saw the children in Dera’a and 
Homs… 
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Zaid: And another question the flag of the revolution, it was the Syrian flag 
Nub: Why do you lift the Syrian flag 
Zaid: Why would you lift the Syrian flag 
Ras: The Spanish also lifted the Syrian flag 
Abu Nub: It was called the Syrian Republic it was not called the Syrian Arab 
Republic 
Zaza: I lifted the flag of the Revolution 
Talk in Kurdish 
Zaza: I raised a banner written on it the children of Dera’, I did not raise it because I 
feel I am a Syrian citizen. Originally I have no feelings of belonging as a Syrian 
citizen, so I would lie to my self, Zaid. I raised the banner because of my humanity as 
a Kurd, I have a humanity that has developed in 40 years, I have been in prison and 
been tortured. For my humanity I raised that banner. Because the Arab opposition I 
am Syrian… No I am not Syrian, I have not repeated the Syrian people is one. The 
Syrian people are not one 
 
31  
Zaid: The ones of the Iraqi Kurds that talk Arabic feels Kurdish, because he suffered 
from the Saddam regime and from Saddam. 
But the Kurd that has lived in the time of Masoud and have not felt of the Arab 
suppression and so on, he does not feel for my Kurdishness. When I was trading with 
the Iraqis, I told them I am from Nap, they would not know where Nap is 
Daw: So, what is your problem? 
Zaid: Nap is a million breathing people, I know that Halabja is 20.000 breathing 
people, and I know where it is geography-wise and so on. And here it is 1 million 
people in Nap and they don’t know where I am. I went to Diyarbakir the biggest 
Kurdish city and the capital of North Kurdistan.  
Im Nub: They don’t know Nap 
Zaid: I told them that I am from Nap, they told me where is Nap, they told me aha it is 
next to Zoa 
Im Nub: They know Oas  
Zaid: They know Zoa and they know Oas but they don’t know Nap 
Im Nub: And Nap is a Kurdish city 
Zaza: this is another subject,  
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Zaid: no, if we return, it is about belonging to a Syrian citizenship 
Zaid: Mr Masoud Barzani until now, the elements of the state, that is forming the 
independent Kurdistan state that he has and with the army and the economics and so 
on 
Daw: This is called politics 
Zaid: And it is only being used inside the Iraqi context 
Daw: This is called politics, it has no connections to the feelings, it is politics 
 
32  
Daw: the reasons for our arrest was deep, I don’t know if you know about the Kurdish 
movement or not, in order for me not to repeat, the history of the PKK to the creation 
of the PYD, if you know it or not, I don’t know if you know it or not? 
The important is that the reason for our arrest was the spread of the KDPS in Nap, 
before the attack on the KDPS. The sympathy of the people with the KDPS and with 
the leadership of Masoud Barzani as an example, and Mustafa Barzani. I don’t want 
to talk long about the party so the talk only becomes on the KDPS, the important is 
that the KDPS was very popular with the people. Even though they [the PYD] are 
explaining to the people that they are protecting the area, and we are leading the area. 
The people were more in support of the party and the movement of the Barzani in 
general. That was why they began with more than one activist from KDPS and they 
arrested them. It was a message to the people and to our friends, and the story grew 
when there was a shooting incidence of a kind in Nap as an example. There was a 
shooting incidence at the civil society here, and a shooting incidence at the military 
security. These two shooting incidences, and then they arrested us, the day that we 
were released, another one. 
 
33  
Zaza: I am sorry that I am interrupting your talk but there is a thing, I was arrested by 
the Syrian regime’s security services, and do you know what they told me directly? 
“Go and do demonstrations but do not lift the flag of the revolution, don’t show any 
relation to Homs, just lift the flag of Kurdistan”. The policies in the Kurdish areas of 
today, the thing about lifting the Kurdistan flag, and not having any relationship with 
the revolution, this is how the Syrian security services wanted it. They told me word 
by word, and to my friends as well while being under their custody, they told us 
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everyday you can make demonstrations, but demand for a Kurdistan do not demand 
for a Syrian revolution. 
 
9.2.5 Asayish Talk 
Present: Daf, Ras, Harriet Ida, Lina and a couple female police officers 
Place: The womens department of the Asayish 
 
34   
Daf: The Turkish state funded the FSA in the shape of the brigade “the Northen 
storm” from Zoa to Nap, and when the FSA and the Jabhat al-Nusrah attacked Nas, 
the FSA and the Jabhat al-Nusrah attacked from Turkey, from the border. They 
entered the tanks and the cars of FSA and Jabhat al-Nusra from Turkey to Nas, and 
Nas is a Kurdish area but there are also Arabs, there are Chechenians, and Kurds. The 
ones who were killed from the lines of the FSA and Jabhat al-Nusrah, the ones that 
died from our hands some of them had Turkish identity cards and there was some of 
them who had military identity necklaces from Turkey as well and we even found the 
Turkish flag, and some of their medical relief from Jabhat al-Nusrah in Nas was also 
for the Turkish state, one was from France and one from Turkey. And the ones that 
were injured and killed all of them are brought to Turkey, and the second time when 
they attacked, they attacked from Turkey. The attack of IS at Ibar, was from Turkey. 
 
35  
H: How do you make sure that the Kurdish people are with you? 
Daf: We have a system, it is not a system that has been there for one or two years in 
the time of the revolution, we have a system that has been in function for 25 years in 
Syria.  
L: What kind of system? 
Daf: We, the system of the PYD, and the system of Tev-Dem [The Western Kurdistan 
Democratic Society Movement]  
H: What is that? 
Daf: Tev-Dem is the The democratic society movement- the Tev-Dem and PYD the 
Democratic Union Party, we, this structure is from the time of the Kurdistans 
worker’s party, the PKK. In Syria we have 5000 martyrs that was martyred in Turkey, 
	   102	  
all the families of these martyrs are our families. I have been apart of the PKK but 
during the revolution I returned to Syria. I went back to Syria and the PKK did not 
forbid me. They did not forbid me. Now we are fighting in Syria. And when we raised 
in the revolution and organisation, we had a lot of martyrs, and before the revolution 
we have martyrs in the prisons who died under torture. 
 
36   
Daf: Here we have a system of laws, we have a system of the laws of parties, all the 
political parties are free, they can create a structure and fight politically. We have no 
problems they can open and office, make celebration, make demonstrations, we don’t 
have a problem, but everything has to be within the system. Everything is in the 
system. Now the PYD wants to create a celebration if they don’t apply for a 
permission with the Asayish [the police], it is forbidden, this is called a system. 
H: You mean a celebration in a public space? 
Daf: Yes in a public space. If you want to make a meeting in your house, there is a 
system that follows a law, there is a law that shows the peace, in all the constitutions 
of the world and in the treaties of the UN.  
The second thing is that we Kurds decided we in our movement decided that we 
should have one military, one military power in the Kurdish areas. Because we saw 
the FSA and we saw the revolution all the villages have gotten their own battalion, all 
family has how many men, they gathered together how many family members and 
they made a battalion. This will not contribute to a unified military system and it 
harms, it does not contribute. It is true that it increased the number, the number will 
become big, like the FSA, they have become a lot, but what happened, this harmed 
their army. We said that we have to have one army, a Kurdish army that is 
participating from the Barazani, from the PYD, from the left party, all come and 
participate in this army, and the army does not have a political division. All the armies 
in the world, even though you are in any political party in the world in any state, your 
party consider you a civilian to the point you become militarised. According to the 
law it would not work that you control your political party with a military power. 
These are the parties; the Azadi party, the KDPS they were ready to form a brigade 
and battalions. Phone is ringing… 
 
37   
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Daf: Therefor we gave permission to all the weapons, who have a weapon should 
have a permission, because the situation of the revolution becomes a chaos if there is 
no law and no judging system. The chaos will destroy everything, therefor everything 
needs a law and a system, to the point that the people understand things for 
themselves, there have to be a change in the culture, changes in the thoughts, because 
for 40 years the Baath regime has been in control. We have internalised the politics of 
the Baath, the traditions of the Baath, the culture of the Baath, we have to free our 
thoughts from the politics of the Baath and the Baath culture. Therefor we are 
depending on the revolution of the thoughts. If our thoughts does not change then the 
politics will not change, and the culture will not change. 
 
38   
Daf: If my goal is the authority and nothing else, and in order to keep the authority I 
will suppress and kill my people. Ok. In our ideas if you reach for the authority it 
means that you become the enemy of the society, because there is no authority in the 
world without suppressing the people and the society.  
There is no authority in the world that does not suppress the people and the society. 
Therefor any person who only goes for the chair of the authority he does not have a 
space between us. In our system he does not have a space. 
We have trainings and accountability on these kinds of issues, between us and for our 
system. You see the chair over there, that chair is for who? For the leader here, but the 
leader does not sit there, they don’t like that chair and does not like to sit over there, 
not because we want to convince you that we don’t want that chair, if you were here 
or not, whoever comes, nobody will sit at that chair. That chair is only for the official 
business  
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H: And how is the plan for the thought revolution? 
Daf: It is going to be on the way of trainings, the academies, the political academy 
and the society academy and the philosopher academy, everything is terminology of 
what the politics are. All the people say that the politics are the art of tricks, the sides 
of politics, when you say politics they see the art of tricks. But we are different when 
we say politics. The expression of the situation, I don’t want to lie about my ways of 
politics and I don’t want to make mistakes on the ways of my politics. Ok. And then 
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the real democracy what is that? All the European countries say they are democratic, 
you are also Europeans and you grew up in the European culture, but where are the 
democracy then? The democracy of the governments, a democratic system, we do not 
object to this kind of democracy, but there are things, I will give an example. The 
European Union, they are moving the borders, there are no borders left behind and the 
people should not have borders between each other. This is a main idea of ours, 
because the people have to live together, therefor we are not requiring the division 
from Syria, not because of the fear that such a project will cause international 
pressure, no this is our conviction. 
H: What kind of democracy do you believe in? 
Daf: We believe in the democracy that the people have the space in it, the democracy 
for Athens were for a certain group. And in the whole world they are dependent on 
elections no? Not everything that is elected mean that it is democratic, not everything. 
The election is a part of the democracy, but the real democracy, if you live in this 
country you would not feel in your soul and in your thoughts in democracy there 
should be an election, every year let it be an election, and then it turn out democratic? 
In our believes the thought revolution has to be made of this, the freedom but what 
does it mean? The real freedom what does it mean? The real freedom. The European 
countries are dependent on the liberal terminology, ok, we do not acknowledge the 
terminology of the liberals, the liberals as we understand it prevent freedom in the 
name of freedom, in the name of freedom they are dissolving freedom. 
Daf: And the Europeans are depending on these models most of all, they are 
depending on these models. And the liberalist are individualists, we are convinced the 
individual without a society cannot live, he cannot live, and the society also should 
not eliminate the individual they should be each others extensions, the individual 
should have some obligations and rights, and the society should have obligations 
towards the individual and in the same time there should be rights. Of course what 
does such and issue need, it needs morals, not everything in the laws will happened, 
yes you put it in the laws and the constitution but if the thoughts of the people is not 
there in the morals. You commit me through morals in customs and tradition I will 
not do things wrong because I know that that is not good. Not because I do not want 
to be accountable, because the law will make me accountable, this has to be my 
conviction. 
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We here believe, it is our conviction that there is no societal spirit in Europe, and do 
you know what Middle Easterners are saying about the Europeans? They are saying 
that the European people are cold. Why do they say that they are cold? Because they 
say the features in the persons are cold. But we are not convinced because their 
features are like this, because there is no society left in Europe, the individualism in 
Europe killed the person, the society and the individual by himself, what is that? All is 
under the personal freedom. Ok, But the personal freedom should not be like this. Me 
and you are living together ok, I have to respect you and you should respect me, it is 
an obligation, I would have an obligation and you will have an obligation towards me, 
we should help each other. We should become one hand. Of course in the Middle 
Eastern culture we find dogmatism as well. Do you understand how? Because the 
rules of the Islamic religion did not let the Middle Eastern people open their thoughts 
and their minds, in Europe there was the critical revolution, and it developed the 
thoughts, thought-wise Europe developed. But Europe paid blood for this, to develop, 
and a lot of the European thinkers, were burned and beheaded, under the control of 
the government of search, and the church but in the in this thought revolution 
[enlightenment] that Europe rose up in, there became developments, not that it 
happened by itself. And in the Middle East also people paid the price of this, but the 
revolution did not come to its rights, now in the Middle East we need a thought 
revolution. Like in Egypt, and Tunis and Libya and like what happens in Syria, ok. In 
the ground the revolution should overthrow the regime but the situation that becomes 
after the revolution, is not better than the time before the revolution, it is worse, why? 
Because there is not a thought revolution. In Syria if the regime was overthrown why 
do we say that the ones that will come instead of the regime will not be better? Why? 
We have a reason. Because his ideas and culture will be the same ideas, it will be the 
culture of the current regime, where this one is called Bashar and the next will be 
called Ali. 
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Daf: This talk and its thoughts belong to him [Abdallah Öcalan], and the trainings and 
the culture, and the thoughts of Öcalan. And our politics are the form, the ideas of 
Öcalan. He is our general leader, and we are linked to him, but not like the leadership 
of the Middle East, not like Hafez al-Asad or Mubarek or Saddam or Atatürk, no. The 
goal is a leader in thought. 
